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ABSTRACT
This thesis discusses whether FDI replaced or the role of the Thai
government or the government supported FDI, for the Thai textile
industry, to maintain international competitiveness in a long-run.
This thesis concludes that the Thai government supported the role
of FDI.
In the 1960-70s, the FDI played an important role on industrial
development; MNCs, based on their advanced technologies and
industrial linkages, provided advanced technologies and input
materials constantly to local large-sized firms. Local large-sized
firms actively involved in joint venture with foreign firms or
collected stake-holders, and developed their technologies and
expanded production. The government supported both types of firm
by providing priviledges. However, in the 1980s to the present,
with expansion of the clothing sector, the textile industry had to
further expand high-quality goods and diversify to high-value
added products. The role of the FDI reduced, because it was not
related to technological development of the entire textile
industry and did not create industrial linkages to the clothing
industry to remain competitive over a on run. Consequently, it is
expected that the Thai textile industry will lose competitiveness
in the future.
This thesis stresses that the Thai government should have played a
key role on developing the entire textile industry and creating
linkage to clothing industry.
Thesis Supervisor: Alice H. Amsden
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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1. Introduction
1.1 Overview
Did foreign direct investment (FDI) replace the role of the
government? The Thai government, particularly the Board of
Investment (BOI) regards FDI as a critical factor for industrial
and technological development.
The basic attitude of the Thai Government toward
foreign participation in the Thai economy in general and
foreign investment is strongly positive. The government
believes foreign investment is good for Thailand and
devotes a great deal of time and energy trying to
attract it, especially into those areas considered to be
of high priority, defined in terms of the country's
national development objectives....The Government
recognizes the impermanent nature of many of our
country's comparative advantages and realizes that
increased productivity is the key to continuing
international competitiveness... we face increasing
competition from countries with even lower labor costs.
We cannot afford to stand still. We must participate in
this era of rapid technological change and to do that we
must cooperate with foreign business organizations in
order to accelerate the transfer of technology into our
country (Panupong,1984:7-10).
In developing its textile1 industry, Thailand has obtained
extensive FDI, especially from Japan2 . However, to sustain
technological development and international competitiveness over an
extended period of time, has FDI, contrary to other Asian countries
such as South Korea where the government has taken a key position
1In this thesis, textile industry is defined as industry producing
staple fiber, yarn, and fabrics.
2 See Appendix 4
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in fostering industrial development, replaced the role of the
government in Thailand? This thesis analyzes the effect the Thai
government and FDI had on technological development and
international competitiveness in the Thai textile industry.
The textile industry has played an important role in the
industrial development of Thailand. Development of the industry
started at the beginning of the 1960s when there were few
industries in Thailand. Since then, the production and export share
of the textile industry has been large in total manufacturing
output of Thailand. FDI, especially by Japanese multinational
companies (MNCs), have held the largest share of Thai textile
production and exports (over 50% of fabrics in 1994), and have
therefore played an important role in its development.
Table 1-1 shows the share held by fabrics and clothing
products in Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in Thailand. The weaving
and clothing industries have held the largest share of total
manufacture (22.4% in 1992). Table 1-2 shows the export performance
of the textile and clothing sectors in the 1990s. The clothing
sector is the most important export earner. Considering the fact
that the Thai balance of trade has been negative, the textile and
the clothing industries have been the most important manufacturing
exporters. Moreover, these two sectors are responsible for
approximately one-third of total manufacturing employment (Table 1-
3).
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Table 1-1 Share Held by the Textile and Clothing Sectors in Thai GDP, 1987-92
Agricultural products
Manufactured products
- Weaving
- Clothing
- Food
- Beverage
- Petroleum
(Mil.B, %)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
120,750 157,783 175,229 164,547 191,392 199,469
315,291 403,034 497,053 595,873 708,868 793,449
(100.0)
38,570 45,569 55,024 64,014 78,547 95,301
(12.0)
35,840 42,340 48,740 61,324 78,172 82,522
(10.4)
32,592 46,351 59,942 57,657 60,678 64,874
(8.2)
23,592 27,844 34,467 38,369 46,835 49,084
(6.2)
22,032 26,921 25,491 25,274 42,221 46,221
(5.8)
Source: Japanese Chamber of Commerce
Table 1-2 Export Performance of Textile & Clothing Sectors in the 1990s
(Mil.B)
Clothing
Computer, parts
Jewelry
Rice
Textile products
Total Exports
Balance of Trade
Source: Japanese Chamber
1990
65,804
38,695
34,892
27,770
22,680
589,813
-254,635
of Commerce,
1991 1992 1993
86,622 88,108 91,548
46,441 57,684 61,500
35,963 36,653 43,100
30,516 36,213 31,000
27,278 29,695 31,519
725,630 824,644 935,862
-233,201 -208,600 -230,734
Thai Textile Manufacturing Association.
10
Table 1-3 Share & Number of Workers Employed in the Textile Industry, 1989-93
(1,000 persons, %)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
A:Total Employment 30,612.0 30,843.0 32,028.0 32,384.0 32,153.0
B:Employment in manufacturing 2,770.0 3,133. 0 3,216.0 3,600.0 3,961.0
C:Employment in Textile & 880.5 975.1 1,037.9 1,070.6 1,100.6
Clothing Industries
C/B 31.8 31.1 32.3 29.7 27.8
Source: Textile Intelligence Unit, Textile Industry Division, Dept. of Industrial Promotion
However, the Thai textile industry has recently faced
increases in its wage levels, and has begun to lose market share to
other lower-wage countries, such as China and Indonesia. This
problem had prompted the industry to think about how to maintain
its industrial competitiveness over the long-run as its wage levels
become higher than those of other developing countries.
This thesis discusses what role FDI and the government have
played in promoting technological development to maintain Thai
long-term competitiveness in its textile industry. The analysis
focuses primarily on the weaving industry, which has held a large
production share of Thai GDP since the 1970s.
1.2 Methodology
Analysis is based on the field research I conducted during the
summer of 1995. Information -i.s shown as data and interviews.
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However, various statistical data describing the 1960s and 1970s
may contain inaccuracies, because some businessmen changed their
figures to avoid business and taxes, and because some businesses,
such as border ones, were not properly registered. Especially,
there is no official data concerning sales, production and capital
accumulation for each Thai company. Given lack of refeable data, I
used the data and the result of field research supplied by Thai
textile experts: Suehiro, A., Yamazawa, I. & Tanbunlertchai, S.,
Ajanant, J., Buddhikarant, and Textile group of Japanese Chamber of
Commerce. As for the 1980s, data from surveys conducted by Japan
International Cooperative Agency (JICA) in 1989 is helpful.
To supplement this shortage of data, and for more detailed
analysis, I interviewed executives listed in Appendix 3.
1.3 Outline
In the third chapter, I focus on Thai industrial development
from the 1960s to the 1970s, and analyze why the Thai textile
industry developed during this period. The analysis starts with
firm level competitiveness: the development of production and sales
technologies in MNCs and local firms. And I look at the
competitiveness of the entire textile industry. The forth chapter
focuses on industrial competitiveness in the 1980s and 1990s. The
fifth chapter compares both periods and discusses the effects of
FDI on technology development, the role of the Thai government, and
whether FDI has replaced the role of the government.
12
2. Theoreuical Background
2.1 Process of industrial development
This thesis classifies industrial competitiveness in
developing countries into the two categories of long-term and
short-term competitiveness. During the initial period of industrial
development, developing countries are highly cost competitive,
primarily because of their low-wage levels. Generally such
countries have many unskilled, low-priced laborers, and their
industries try to hold onto their competitiveness by relying on
labor intensive technologies to produce low-priced goods. In this
thesis, this factor is referred to as "short-term competitiveness."
As these industries develop, they need to rethink their
strategies to remain competitive over the long run. To acquire this
"long-term competitiveness," these industries need to consider
modes of "differentiation" as well as those of low-cost
competitiveness. For Porter3, the strength of "differentiation"
competitiveness differs depending on whether production is
performed at comparable cost but in unique ways that greatly
differentiate the product from that of its competitors. This
concept includes high quality and high value-added products and
services, such as those built into a quick response system. To
acquire long-term competitiveness, industry should develop
13
3 Porter, 1992
technology at both firm and industrial levels.
2.2 Long-term competitiveness: At the level of the firm
At the level of the firm, to remain competitive over the
long-run, companies should improve cost and non-cost
competitiveness. To improve cost competitiveness further, firms may
need production processes that are innovative and that introduce
new machinery. Firms also need to improve non-cost competitiveness
by upgrading such factors as quality control and sales technology.
Porter4 classifies these firms' activities, and suggests that
conditions at each stage influence both competitiveness of "low
relative cost"5 and "differentiation". His classification of a
firm's activities is summarized as follows: production activities
are classified as upstream activities, downstream activities and
support activities. Upstream activities characterize physical
creation of the product, and downstream activities refer to sales,
marketing and services after sale. These two activities are
production processes which start with the processing of material
sales. Support activities strongly influence up- and downstream
activities, and also influence each other. "Procurement" is
obtaining inputs, such as raw materials, intermediate goods and
4 Porter, 1992
5Porter classifies firms' competitive advantage into "low relative
cost," which in my terms is referred to as cost competitiveness, and
"differentiation."
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machinery; "technology development" includes designing products and
process innovation. "Human resource management" is recruiting and
training workers, and creation and improvement of the
organizational structure of a firm. "Firm infrastructure" includes
general management, finance, strategic planning and other
activities which determine the managerial ability of the firm. To
maintain cost and differentiation competitiveness in the long run,
it is necessary to recognize the importance of "support activities"
rather than simply those of low-cost labor. These activities
strongly influence both cost and differentiation competitiveness;
if a capable manager innovates upon a production process, it may
reduce both production costs and create new products.
When these concepts are applied to industries in developing
countries, another consideration is necessary. Since these
industries initially obtain competitiveness based only on the low
levels of wages, and develop by obtaining more sophisticated
technologies through transfers from developed countries, the
processes of technological development in developing countries is
different from those in developed countries. For example, it is
often remarked that competitiveness in the Thai textile industry is
based on the low cost of its labor. Other less developed countries
which have lower labor costs, such as China, have tended to catch
up and match the competitiveness of Thailand. Based on only cost
competitiveness, the Thai textile industry will be overwhelmed by
China in the near future. As the Thai economy develops, its
currency is expected to appreciate and its wage levels are
15
similarly, expected to rise; hence, Thai industries will gradually
lose competitiveness based only on low wages.
Thus, "technology development" should be modified. The MIT
Commission on Industrial Productivity (1989) cites up-to-date
machinery and increased physical productivity as two of the key
factors which are necessary to mai-tain competitiveness when low-
wage countries threaten higher-wage ones. In addition, production
skills are also extremely important to the production of high
quality goods6. Even if firms purchase highly efficient machinery,
it is meaningless for workers who have not been trained how to
utilize them. For example, although the Japanese level of wages is
far higher than those in developing countries, the skill of
Japanese weavers to produce high quality fabrics in small-sized
firms remains internationally competitive. Consequently, Japanese
textile goods, because of their quality, have a higher level of
competitiveness than those of South Korea which imposed cost
priorities 7 particularly in the 1960s.
Therefore, in the process of technological development, firms
adopt strategies that are either skill or capital intensive.
Capital intensive firms are defined as those which produce based on
economies of scale. This type includes firms which produce large
amounts of standardized products. Skill-intensive firms are defined
as those that focus on various kinds of high value-added goods.
6 Lall, 1992
7 In the recent past, because of the extreme appreciation of the yen,
Japanese weavers began to lose their competitiveness.
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However, most firms in developing countries cannot easily
follow this process. Instead, these firms often have difficulty of
obtaining advanced skills and the machinery necessary to produce
high quality or high value-added goods. The problem stems from
structural differences between developing and developed countries;
too often "support activities" in developing countries have not yet
been sufficiently developed to be competitive at the international
level. Firms in developing countries generally lack financial
resources enough to obtain up-to-date machines and human resources
which have advanced knowledge about production skills. Adding to
production technology, they also need sales technology. It is often
believed that firms in developing countries deliver goods late or
do not have adequate international sales routes. Therefore, to
analyze technological development in developing countries, it is
important to think about how firms catch up with the levels of
advanced technologies in industrialized countries.
2.3 Long-term competitiveness: Industrial structure
Added to activities at the firm's level, industrial structure
also strongly influences "long-term competitiveness." Industrial
structure includes the linkage of each sector, such as fiber,
spinning, weaving, dyeing and clothing manufacturing, and inter-
firm linkages, such as subcontracting systems. For instance,
whether the weaving industry produces high-value-added or low-
priced goods largely depends on what kinds of goods clothing
17
companies produce. Whether a firm can obtain technologically
advanced machinery often depends on what kinds of machines the
domestic machinery industry produces. Such factors result in large
differences in cost competitiveness because how quickly goods can
be produced depends on whether a firm has to import machines or can
obtain them from domestic producers. Thus, domestic industrial
structure is also an extremely important determinant of long-term
competitiveness. The MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity
(1989) also points to industrial structure as one of the factors
which are necessary for a country to remain competitive when low-
wage countries threaten them. According to the MIT research,
Italian clothing firms succeeded in producing high value-added and
specialized products by developing a flexible subcontracting
system. Similarly but differently, in the Japanese textile
industry, there are many small weaving factories which form a group
with a head, called sanmoto. Large-sized textile fiber companies
commission orders through their sanmoto, to small-sized weaving
firms to produce the required fabrics, and thus the staple fiber
and fabric sectors are linked. There are also industrial linkages
between the weaving and clothing sectors, in which Japanese trading
companies, acting as middlemen, take responsibility for sales.
Based on this system, textile companies can effect a flexible
production system, which enables them to produce various kinds of
goods quickly in response to changing market demands.
The final stage is rationalization. As the economy develops,
the wage level may rise and currency may appreciate; consequently,
18
an industry may lose its cost competitiveness. To survive in the
international market, the industry may have to be restructured.
Since the Japanese yen increased rapidly in the 1990s, it is often
remarked that the Japanese textile industry needs again to adjust
industrially.
2.4 Has FDI replaced the role of the government in Thailand?
Figure 2-1 summarizes the previous discussions concerning the
industrial competitiveness and technology of developing countries.
I classify factors which are necessary for long-term
competitiveness, and firm-level and industrial level
competitiveness, all of which affect each other.
Based on Amsden's articles, the role of the state in the
process of industrial development in developing countries can be
viewed as twofold: "getting the price wrong" to initialize
industries, such as import tariffs and export subsidies, and
providing "Beta technology", such as management systems, labor
relations, shopfloor practices, subcontractual arrangements,
arrangement of infrastructure and public policies, with firms so
that firms can maintain industrial development over a prolonged
period of time9 . This role of the state can also be classified
according to the concepts of "short-term competitiveness" and
8 Amsden, 1992
9 This thesis does not analyze the role of the government on social
infrastructure, such as education, and provision of electoricity.
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"long-term competitiveness." When industry obtains short-term
competitiveness, based on low labor costs, government is expected
to manipulate market prices to protect and support its domestic
industries. The government provides high import tariffs, export
subsidies, and tax exemptions to encourage potentially competitive
industries to invest heavily until the domestic industries acquire
a level of technological expertise sufficient to compete with other
advanced competitors in the international marketplace. I analyze
whether the Thai textile industry successfully competed against
imported products only because FDI brought advanced technology or
if the government spurred technological development.
When industry develops and needs to obtain long-term
competitiveness, the role of the government to provide "Beta
technology" is extremely important. In this thesis, I use the
framework shown in Figure 2-1, to discuss firm-level and industrial
structure level competitiveness. In firm-level competitiveness, I
define "production technology" and "sales technology" as the
technologies which firms need to obtain long-term
competitiveness.10 In firm-level competitiveness, I analyze whether
the Thai government has helped its textile industry obtain
"production technology", and "sales technology" so as to promote
long-term competitiveness, or whether Pl has replaced this role of
the government.
As for industrial structure, I use two perspectives to analyze
10This is based on the discussion of the previous section.
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the roles of FDI and the government. First, I focus on the role of
the government and of FDI in promoting domestic industrial linkage
in a world market in which competition has increasingly become
severe for developing countries. At present, the Thai textile
industry faces increase in wage level and, at the same time, is
seriously affected by the protectionism effected by various
developed countries. Moreover, a number of developing countries
have been simultaneously trying to initialize industrialization
through textiles. Under these circumstances, it is important for
firms to procure input materials as early as possible, and to
produce high quality goods. If there is no linkage between a
weaving and a clothing firm, the weaving firm has to find its own
export routes even though the clothing firms may be importing the
same kind of woven product. This is disadvantageous for both firms,
because such procedures may be more time-consuming and demand
reliance on less stable relationships than those formed by domestic
trade. Moreover, this linkage is also important for growth in GDP;
if these two sectors are linked, growth in clothing production also
means production expansion of weaving sector, which further
increase GDP.
Second, my analysis also examines technological diffusion
throughout the entire textile industry in Thailand. Although many
articles discuss the role of foreign direct investment in
technological development, most articles only analyze technology
22
transfers within a multinational firm.'l However, to understand
technological development in an industry, it is equally important
to examine other local firms' activities. In this thesis, I would
like to ascertain to what extent FDI has effected the diffusion of
advanced technologies in Thailand.
11For example, Panupong (1984) and Tho (1992).
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3. Development Process of the Thai Textile Industry: 1960s-70s
In this chapter, I discuss Thai industrial development in the
1960-70s. After reviewing activities of MNCs and government
policies, the developmental processes effected during this period
are described. In the next section, firm level competitiveness is
analyzed including whether firms had competitiveness in
"production technologies" and "sales technologies," as defined in
chapter 2. In the third section, I focus on industrial structure:
which type of firms succeeded in expanding their production. In
the last section, by analyzing the capital accumulation and
business abilities of certain firms, I discuss why some firms were
able to achieve these levels of competitiveness, and why others
were not.
3.1 Production performance in import substitution period: from the
1960s to the early 1970s
The Thai textile industry started to increase production in
the middle of the 1960s, and completed a period of import
substitution in the early 1970s. Figures 3-1 and 3-2 show the
transition of cotton and man-made fabrics of import domestic
demand (M/D) ratio and export domestic production (X/S) ratio. The
M/D decline suggests that the Thai weaving industry substitutes
imports for domestic demand. For both cotton and man-made fabrics,
the M/D ratio started declining in the middle of the 1960s and was
exceeded by an X/S ratio in the middle of the 1970s.
24
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Until the 1950s, there were almost no textile industries in
Thailand except for a few cotton firms. In the early 1960s, the
Thai government started to promote the textile industry, and some
local firms started their own businesses. However, man-made
products were not produced; rather, most were imported (Figure 3-
2). Table 3-1 shows the share of Thai import partners in total
import of man-made fibrics in 1960. Japan, which had a strong
level of international competitiveness at that time, held the
largest share especially in man-made products.
Table 3-1 Importers Share of Man-made Fiber Fabrics, 1958-60
(Unit: 1000 sqy)
1958 1959 1960
Import Total 29,987(100%) 32,927 (100%) 23,889 (100%)
-From Japan 21,404 (71%) 24,733 (75%) 18,091 (76%)
-From US 4,754 (16%) 5,427 (16%) 4,156 (17%)
Source: Kamiya 1965.
In the middle of the 1960s, a number of MNCs in developed
countries, especially Japanese firms, shifted production
facilities from their home countries to Thailand to take advantage
of its low labor costs1 2. At that time, because Japanese companies
were suffering from a serious recession and wage increases, they
wanted to keep their high export share in the Thai textile market,
and they assumed that the Thai government would restrict imports
12 Textile MNCs established in the 1960-70s are listed in Appendix 4.
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of these products so that domestic industries could develop. What
triggered FDI was the Investment Promotion Act by BOI in 1962.
Under the BOI Investment Promotion Act most MNCs were given a
variety of incentives to invest in Thailand 13. MNCs were interested
in such privileges as exemption of business and income taxes,
guaranteed remittance of profits in Thailand, and guaranteed
working permission for their engineers14 . In 1963, Japanese
companies started production in Thailand15.
FDI held many more shares of man-made products than cotton.
As for man-made fiber production, three MNCs, Teijin Toray and
Asia Fiber, held 100% share of production until the middle of the
1970s 16. Table 3-2 shows the production share of FDI in 1972, when
Thai cotton and man-made weavings almost substituted for imported
products. FDI held many more shares of man-made yarns than cotton.
Foreign firms also provided most of the filament weaving and
polyester/rayon blended fabrics. The reason for FDI's larger share
of man-made goods was that the MNCs initially avlided competition
with local large-sized firms belonging to local business group
which already produced cotton goods. Moreover, share of FDI in
spun yarn was more than that of fabric production, since local
weaving firms already started their production before the 1960s.
Although FDI held a large share of man-made fiber and spinning
13 See Appendix 1
14 See Appendix 1
15 See Suehiro, 1981, and Institute of Developing Economies, 1960.
1 6 Japanese Chamber of Commerce, 1972, and Suehiro, 1981.
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production during this period, large share of weaving production
was held by local firms.
Table 3-2 Share of FDI and Local Firms in 1972 (%)
Yarn
FDI/JV
Business
group
BOI promoted
Cotton
39.4
53.4
P/C
49.8
30.9
80.2 100.0
Man-made yarn
61.7
22.4
94.6
Cotton P/C P/R
FDI/JV 14.3 38.1 49.7
Business 11.2 37.8 24.7
group
BOI promoted 46.1 58.1 84.0
* P/C: Polyester cotton, P/R: Polyester rayon
Source: Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Board of Investment
Spun
Total
23.0
18.8
Filament
90.2
0
52.1 41.5
The labor productivity of MNCs was higher than that of local
firms. Table 3-3 shows the difference of productivity among
Japanese, MNCs in Thailand and Thai local firms. At this point,
foreign firms had more advanced production technologies than local
firms and MNCs' production activities were far more efficient1 7.
However, productivity of MNCs in Thailand was lower than that of
17 Buddhikarant, 1973
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the Japanese textile industry, and the Thai textile firms used
more labor-intensive machines; the level of production technology
in the Thai textile industry had not caught up with the level in
advanced countries.
Table 3-3 Labor Productivity and Capital Output Ratio of Firms in
the Early 1970s (1,000 Bahts)
labor productivity Y/K
FDI (MNCs stock share more than 50%) 87.27 0.79
Local firms (MNCs less than 50%) 56.24 0.57
Local firms (100% Thais) 54.25 0.65
Japanese weaving firms in Japan 159.53
Y/K: capital output ratio
K = gross value of land + building + machinery, equipment & mprovement
plus other fixed assets.
Source: Buddhikarant, R., A Case Study on the Economic Contribution of Private Direct
Foreign Investment in the Textile Industry, Master thesis, 1973.
MITI, Industrial Statistics, JaDanese Lona-term Statistics
3.2 Government policy
Adding to BOI promotion, the government policies during the
1960-70s are divided into protection of domestic market and
promotion of export.
To protect its domestic market, the Thai government used
tariff protection and controlled the number of textile production
facilities1 8. Table 3-4 shows the transition of tariff rates on
30
18 See Appendix 1
imported textile goods. As is apparent, the government manipulated
international market prices to protect the domestic Thai textile
industry.
Table 3-4 Import Tariff of Thai Textile Goods, 1960-80s (%)
Cotton Yarn
P/C Yarn
P/R Yarn
Cotton Fabrics
P/C Fabrics
P/R Fabrics
Clothing
1960-62 62-65 65-68
20.0 20.0 20.0
20.0 20.0 20.0
22.0 35.0 35.0
37.0 37.0 40.0
37.0 37.0 40.0
27.5 27.5 30.0
68-71
25 .'0
20.0
20.0
60.0
60.0
60.0
71-78
25.0
20.0
20.0
60.0
60.0
60.0
78-82
25.0
20.0
20.0
80.0
80.0
80.0
82-85
27.0
22.0
22.0
66.0
66.0
66.0
85-
30.0
30.0
30.0
60.0
60.0
60.0
40.0 60.0 100.0 66.0 60.0
Source:Tambunlertchai, S., & Yamazawa, I., Manufactured Exports and Foreign Direct
Investment: A Case Study of the Textile Industry in Thailand, 1981.
It is difficult to present in figures what extent Thai
government effectively protected its domestic market. However, as
based on the information available, it is possible to say that the
government strongly protected Thai textile market for domestic
firms to develop their technologies. Tambunlertchai & Yamazawa
(1981) measured the "effective protection rate" of the Thai
textile industry1 9 . The rate of polyester cotton (P/C) and
19The effective rate is "calculated by adjusting tariffs on output net
of those on input and expressing them in terms of the rate of increase in
value-added of domestic activity in producing goods competitive with the
import concerned" (Tambunlertchai & Yamazawa, 1981)
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polyester rayon (P/R) yarns are 20-25 percent, while that of P/C
and P/R fabrics exceeded 200% in 1970. Since the effective
protection rate was much higher than a nominal protection rate
presented in Table 3-4, protection was stronger than the nominal
tariff rate.
Table 3-5 Domestic Prices vs Export Prices, 1978-79
June 14, 1978 Dec. 3, 1978 June 13, 1979
Cotton Yarn PD(a) 28.9 35-36 35
40s (B/lb) PX(c) 27.5 34.5 28.0
PX(d) 27.8 32.0 33.0
Cotton fabric PD(b) 12.5 14.25 14.25
broad cloth grey PX(e) 9.2 12.4 10.6
2210,50" (B/yd) PX(e) 8.2 11.6 10.4
P/C Yarn PD(a) 38.25 38-39 38-39
45s (B/lb) PX(d) 27.6 35.4 33.4
PX(d) 27.0 32.0 30.0
P/C fabric PD(b) 11.55 14.2-15.0 14.5
186 threads PX(e) 9.4 12.3 10.8
47 grey (B/yd) PX(e) 9.6 12.2 -
PD (Domestic price): Weekly average price at San Pen market.
PX (Export price) : export price of South Korea and Taiwan
(a)-(e) attached to specify the form of payment, such as (a) cash, (b) at 60
days sight, (c) C&F, (d)F.O.B., and (e) at sight.
Source: Tambunlertchai & Yamazawa, Manufactured Exports and Foreign Direct Investment: A Case
Study of the Textile Industry in Thailand, 1981.
The effect of these policies can also be shown as price
difference between the international and the local Thai markets.
Table 3-5 compares these differences at the end of the 1970s.
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Domestic prices were higher than international ones.
Adding to the figures, there were several "unrecorded" facts
which shows the government's protection of domestic market. In
1966, because of a recession in Japan, its small- and medium-sized
trading companies delivered bad quality fabrics to Thailand to be
sold at extremely cheap prices20 . For example, the share in total
Japanese export goods to Thailand of textile filament fabrics
which Japanese large-sized trading firms sold was only 35.1% in
amount and 49.5% in value in 1966. In order to avoid market chaos,
the government believed its protection was necessary. Furthermore,
the determinants or consumers' selections, whether imported
Japanese goods or Thai products, were not only price but also
credibility of quality. To compete with the high credibility of
Japanese goods, high tariff protections were necessary.
"At first, we had a hard time in Thailand because
Japanese textile goods were of good quality and good
reputation. The Thai government guaranteed our profit by
implementing high tariffs on imported goods."
(President of Thai Toray Textile Mills, Japanese Chamber
of Commerce, 1970)
In the early 1970s, the Thai textile industry completed
import substitution2 1. Thai domestic textile production not only
fulfilled domestic demand but exceeded it. Furthhermore, Thai
market had a problem of oversupply of domestic textile goods.
20 Japanese Chamber of Commerce, 1966.
21 Figures 3-1, 3-2
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Domestic textile goods were sold in the Thai textile market, San
Pen. San Pen not only sold products for the Thai domestic market
but also for its border businesses22 . However, when border
countries became Socialist in 1973, the sales routes to these areas
were closed, and producers faced a problem of oversupply. In
response, San Pen considered selling its stock at extremely cheap
prices to unload its inventory, but the government tried to avoid
this situation23. The government shifted its strategy from import
substitution to export promotion. It restricted production in the
domestic market and promoted production for export goods24. The
government tried to shift production from the domestic market to
the international one (Interview #5). Figure 3-3 illustrates the
export promotion policy of the Thai government. However, to export,
Thai firms first had to improve their quality so that they would be
competitive.
The weakness facing exports by the Thai textile industry was
the difference in levels of quality acceptable in the domestic
market and those expected in the international one. To export to
international markets, Thai producers had to improve their
technology. For example, in the Thai domestic market, goods are
often sold by "chop", since the Thais are used to purchasing
22 For Thai textile producers, sale in the Laotian, Cambodian and
Vietnamese markets held a very important share of their total sales,
approximately 20-30%. This amount of sales were not listed in trade
statistics.
23 Japanese Chamber of Commerce, 1975
24 See Appendix 1
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Figure 3-3 Export Promotion Policy
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fabrics and having tailors make their clothes, while the producers
had to export Thai textile on "rollers." If there were
inconsistencies on one part of a roll (Figure 3-4), the producers
could sell it to the domestic market because they could cut out
the part with the poor quality, that is, they could separate the
roll and sell the fabric by chop, but they could not export the
same roll to the international market (interview #9). Furthermore,
"most Thai consumers have never examined the number of faults in
one square yard while international purchasers insist on the
fewest number of faults. They (Thais) pay for both low quality and
high priced items (Ajanant, 1985:73)." Therefore, for domestic
producers to sell in the international market, they had to improve
their production technology; producers needed to purchase a new
type of machine, the shuttleless loom, which has a very low
probability for these kinds of defects and produces fabric much
more quickly than the shuttle loom. Furthermore, exporters needed
a more sophisticated sales technology; i.e., producers had to pack
goods properly, while they did not need to do so for sale in the
domestic market25 .
Furthermore, because domestic price of textile goods were
higher than international one (Table 3-4), producers needed to
produce less expensive, better quality goods for export.
Consequently, many Thai firms preferred to produce for the
25 Yamazawa & Tanbunlertchai, 1981
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Figure 3-4 Difference of Weaving Quality between Domestic and
International Market
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domestic market rather than the international one26. To promote
exports, government export promotion program was necessary.
To overcome these problems, the government implemented
policies which improved the quality of textile goods. First, BOI
established a set of conditions under which it would lot aid firms
unless they reinvested in new machinery. On the other hand, to
deal with a problem of oversupply, the government restricted
production facilities used for the domestic market, while it
exempted mport tariffs on input materials for yarn, fabrics and
clothing exporters.
Simultaneously, the government promoted technology ransfers
within multinational firms. For example, the Foreigners'
Occupation Control Law restricted the number of working visas
issued to foreign personnel, and thereby initiated the replacement
of foreign management and technical personnel in MNCs with Thai
personnel.
Thai textile firms also ried to export their goods to solve
their problems of oversupply. Both large-sized local firms and
MNCs also started exporting in 1973-74. According to Government
records, all of the cotton and man-made fiber exporting fabric
firms were MNCs and local large sized firms in 197327.
Consequently, as shown in Figures 3-1 and 3-2, the export
production ratio started to exceed the import domestic demand
26 Japanese Chamber of Commerce
27 Ministry of Commerce, 1973
38
ratio in cotton and man-made fabrics in the middle of the 1970s.
Table 3-6 Export Performance of Fabrics in 1976 and 1977
(Mil. sqy)
1976 1977
Cotton fabrics 113 107
Man-made fabrics 133.5 165
P/C 130 N.A.
P/R 3.5 N.A.
Fabrics total 246.5 272
Source: Yoshino, S., "The Thai textile industry" (Kaifuku no ichizirushii Thai no senni
sangyo), in Kasen geppo, October, 1978, pp.3-7.
In particular, textile exports expanded quickly in 1977-78
when the international market started to recover rapidly and these
firms were able to benefit from utilizing the export incentives
provided by the government2 8 . In 1978, because of the appreciation
of the yen, a trade agreement with Laos, and a shortage of
supplies in South Korea and Taiwan, Thai textile exports began to
increase 29. Export increased in standardized fabrics, especially in
P/C products. Table 3-6 shows the Export performance in 1976-77.
Since Japanese trading companies introduced polyester cotton
products in 1968, the Thai textile industry has developed with the
largest share of P/C goods of all cotton and man-made fabrics.
28 Teravaninthorn, 1982
29 Yoshino, 1978
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Export of cotton fabrics also increased: since producers use the
same production facilities for both cotton and polyester fabrics,
many firms produce both fabrics.
3.3 Technological level of firms in weaving export expansion
period: the 1970s
This section compares "production technology" and "sales
technologies" of FDI and local firms. Comparison of the
technological levels of each type of firm makes it clear in what
ways technology developed in this period.
3.3.1 Physical production technology
Whether the level of technology satisfied the international
market differed depending on the products. As for production of
grey fabrics, which is relatively easy to master the technology
for, many local and foreign large-sized firms mastered production
technology completely, and many exported their products to
advanced counties, such as those in the EC countries. Half of
cotton and polyester weavers had dying facilities. Since it was
more difficult to master the production technology for dyed
fabrics, the quality of these products did not meet the standards
set in advanced countries, and these fabrics were exported to
Middle Eastern and Asian countries. And since it was difficult to
master the production technology for polyester/rayon (P/R)
fabrics, only grey fabrics were exportable to EC countries. As for
filament fabrics, since "the world's most modern water-jet loom is
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not yet available in Thailand 30 ," the technology level of filament
was not as high as the international level. Filament fabrics
require a far more difficult technology, and only local firms
which produced jointly with foreign ones were able to produce
these fabrics. As for the domestic market, demand for filament was
not so large, and most products produced were for the border
businesses3 1. On the other hand, in the spinning sector, 95% of the
firms were large firms, at least 20,000 spindles 32, and spinning
plants were generally modern33
30 Teravaninthorn, 1982
31 Tambumlertchai & Yamazawa, 1981
32 Teravaninthorn, 1982
33 Ajanant, 1985
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Table 3-7 Share of FDI and Local Firms in Total Production Facilities
in 1972 and 1979 (%)
Spinning Weaving
Spun Filament
FDI 1972 49.7 23.7 90.2
1979 29.1 18.7 25.9
Local Large-sized* 1972 50.3 18.8 0
1979 68.1 22.5 55.1
*: Local large-sized firms include members of TTMA34 except for MNCs.
Source: Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Production Facilities-in Thailand, 1979.
During the 1970s, large local firms expanded their production
share in textile industry. Because of the recession in the middle
of the 1970s, several MNCs withdrew from Thailand. Thai local
firms, especially local business groups, such as Sukree and Saha
Union, took over these firms and expanded their production. Table
3-7 shows that by 1979 local firms held a larger share of spinning
and weaving production compared to 1972.
On the other hand, the level of production technology of
small-sized firms was extremely low. "Most small- and medium-scale
weaving firms still use semi-automobile one shuttle and four-
shuttle looms of domestic origin or second-hand looms imported
from Hong Kong" (Teravaninthorn, 1982:43). The production share of
small and medium sized firms declined, because they had neither
acquired new production technologies nor were their sales
42
34 See Appendix 2.
technologies internationally competitive; as a result they were
not readily able to export their goods. Table 3-8 compares the
production shares and productivities of small- and large-sized
firms. In the Thai textile industry, most large-sized firms
generally belonged to the Thai Textile Manufacturing Association
(TTMA), while many small and medium sized firms belonged to Thai
Weaving Manufacturing Association (TWMA)35 (Appendix 2). As
evidenced by this table, since TWMA firms did not increase their
productivity, their share of production was reduced during this
period36 .
Table 3-8 Share of Production and Productivity of
1961 1975
Number of looms owned 4,120
by TWMA firms
Share of total number 59.9
of looms (%)
Production of fabric 41,155
by TWMA firms (Mil.sqy)
Share of total production (%) 48.1
Productivity per loom 10.0
of TWMA (Mil.sqy)
Productivity per loom 15.0
of the other weaving firms
(Mil. sqy)
Source: Suehiro, A., 1981.
12,700
26.6
147,800
16.2
11.6
21.1
TWMA in 1961,75, & 79
1979
20,514
35.6
233,300
16.0
11.4
33.2
Because of the recession and the prohibition against
35 Family-sized firms (three or four workers) were not included by TWMA.
36 Suehiro, 1981
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conducting border business with Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, small
sized firms did not, like large-sized ones, start exporting in
1974. These small firms did not start to export until 1977-7837.
However, the increase in exports of 1977-78 was attributed to the
lessened cost competitiveness of Japanese firms and the lack of
production facilities in competitive countries38. Therefore,
considering their low level of productivity and technology, the
competitiveness of small firms was based solely on their "short-
term competitiveness" and consequently can be thought of as
unstable or temporary. For example, "to produce shirting of stable
fibers, large firms use shuttleless looms and piece-dyed
technology, while small- and medium-sized firms use semi-automatic
four shuttle looms and yarn-dyed technology. Although both produce
different quality products that are labelled under the same
category, "shirting" (Teravaninthorn, 1982:54), the production
technology of small- and medium-sized firms was not advanced.
3.3.2 Sales technology
As for levels of sales technology, there was a dual structure
between large-sized, and small- and medium-sized firms. Large-sized
firms, most of which exported, had their own exporting
strategies 3 9. They worked assiduously toward increasing their
exports, and paid much attention to product quality and punctual
37 Teravaninthorn, 1982
38 Yoshino, 1978
39 Yamazawa & Tanbunlertchai, 1981
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delivery. They also tried to establish stable export channels, and
strove to meet export ratio targets which they established by
themselves40 . FDI firms and local large-sized firms which had
entered joint-ventures with MNCs obtained their export channels
through, for instance, Japanese trading companies. Table 3-9 shows
how local large-sized firms succeeded in exporting. This table
selected exporting firms from firms which Tanbunlertchai & Yamazawa
(1981) interviewed. Among 11 exporting firms, all firms were
related with trading companies, including Japanese trading
companies. Some local firms exported directly, or through trading
companies affiliated with their business groups. Table 3-8
illustrates increases in the sales records of Texport International
Corp. Ltd., a trading company of the Saha Union Group. This company
was granted promotional priviledges41 by BOI, which set the target
of export value to each promoted firm. Texport largely exceeded
this target in every year. This table shows that successful export
performance of this textile business group.
40 Teravaninthorn, 1982
41 This company obtained exemption of business and income taxes by BOI.
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Table 3-9 Export Performance of Texport International Corp. Ltd.
in the Late 1970s
Date of Operation
(Mil. Baht)
January, 1979
1st year 2nd year 3rd year
Performance
Target
Source: Ajanant, 1983.
635.1
300.0
874.4
400.0
1,216.2
500.0
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Table 3-10 Thai Local Large-sized Exporting Firm
Stake of
Foreign companies
Bangkok Weaving Mills
K. Cotton & Gauze Co., Ltd.
Royal Textile Co., Ltd.
JTC
None
None
Sales route
Export: Japanese or
their own route
JTC for Export
San Pen for domestic
market
JTC for Export
San Pen for domestic
market
Siam Synthetic Textile
Industry Ltd.
Siam Synthetic Weaving
JTC, Toray
JTC, Kanesho
Production: Japanese
Sales: Japanese
JTC or other trading
companies for export
Thai Durable Textile
Thai Filament Textile
The Thai Textile Co.
Thai Weaving & Knitting
Factory
Unity Textile, Ltd.
Taiwan
Teijin,
Teijin,
Toyota
Thai trading companies or
their own route for export,
San Pen for domestic market
Production: Japanese
JTC for export San Pen for
domestic market
Fujibo,
None
None
JTC or other foreign trading
firms for export, San Pen for
domestic market
JTC or Thai trading firms
or their own routes,San Pen for
domestic market
JTC or their own route
San Pen for domestic market
The Winner Textile JTC, Toray
JTC: Japanese Trading Company
Source: Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Suehiro, A., Capital Accumulation in Thailand, 1989.
Tambumlertchai & Yamazawa, Manufactured Exports and Foreign Direct Investment: A Case Study of
the Textile Industry in Thailand, 1981.
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Firm
JTC
On the other hand, small- and medium-sized firms had little or
no sales technology; they did not have any exporting channels or
strategies, and were unable to contract with Japanese trading
companies because of the low quality of their goods (Interview #20,
#21). Instead, these firms developed export channels through friends
or relatives living in other Asian countries. Even if most of them
were able to export, they lacked long-term export strategies42
3.4 Industrial structure
Table 3-11 Integrated Firms in Spinning and Weaving Sectors in 1972 and 1979
1972 1978
Integrated firms 18 24
Spinning
Number of spindles
Share of total spindles (%)
Weaving
Number of looms
Share of total looms (%)
Source: Suehiro, A., 1980.
596,520
82.0
11,113
58.3
972,084
83.8
20,213
65.9
There was strong integration within competitive firms through
spinning, weaving and dyeing factories. Table 3-10 shows the
production facilities share among integrated firms. Most large-sized
42 Teravaninthorn, 1982
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firms had both spinning and weaving sectors. Labor productivity of
integrated exporting firms (9,144 baht per month) was higher than
individual firms which had over 200 employees (7,770 baht per
month) 43. Thus, many large-sized firms created inter sector
competitive linkages by themselves.
Table 3-12 Production Share of the Seven Groups in 1976
F/L*
Teijin F
Praman L
Toray TAL F
Sukree L
TDT L
Marubeni F
Total
Share in entire
textile firms (%)
*: Foreign managed or local managed
** 1975.
Source: Suehiro, A., 1979.
Capital
2,806.9
530.8
1, 597.7
2,137.5
2,118.3
324.1
11,393.8
85.0
Sales
1,020.
340.
944.
1,090.
991.
324.
5,439.
76.
Number of Number of
Spindles** Looms**
7 41,504 1,008
1 62,560 600
3 60,848 1,882
8 106,280 2,948
2 141,256 3,520
7 30,728 1,000
0 661,752 13,965
4 61.5 28.6
MNCs created industrial linkages by cooperating with other
local large-sized firms. Figure 3-5 illustrates linkages between
MNCs and local large business groups. Based on Table 3-11, which
shows capital accumulation and sales of these seven business
49
43 Suehiro, 1982
groups, these groups held the largest share of production of the
Thai textile industry. Although the other local large-sized firms
also created these linkages44, the share of seven business groups
was extremely large in total sales and capital in the Thai textile
industry. Sukree, Toray, and Teijin created the largest size of
inter-sector linkages; they established the entire production
system of the textile industry, including fiber producing,
spinning, weaving, dyeing and clothing by the middle of 197545.
These three group also created inter-sector linkages of other
large-sized firms by providing polyester and nylon staple fibers46,
so that other large-sized firms did not need to import man-made
staple fibers. Two MNC groups also created competitive inter-firm
linkages with local firms; Teijin had a close relationship with
the Praman group, while Toray had one with the TAL group.
Other local large-sized firms also linked to other large-
sized firms by providing their products; not only Toray, but
Hantex and Asia Fiber provided Nylon fiber to other large-sized
firms. Therefore, in terms of industrial structure, both the MNCs
and local business groups produced inter-firm linkages to produce
standard products of cotton, P/C and P/R fabrics. Since these
large-sized firms held large share of production (Table 3-8), it
is possible to say that competitive firms belonged into industrial
44 Eight integrated spinning and weaging firms did not belong to any
seven business groups in 1972.
45 Suehiro, 1979
46 Suehiro, 1982
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linkage in the 1970s.
On the other hand, small- and medium-sized firms were not
able to join any industrial linkages. Instead they purchased dyed
yarn from separate yarn producing firms, and produced fabrics
which needed no further processing nor finishing47.
Figure 3-5 Industrial Linkage within Textile Sector
Group Man-made Fiber Spinning Weaving
Teijin Teijin Polyester T h a i T e i i
Thai Fi lame
Praman Thai Textile (P/C, C)
Thai Cotton (C)
Dyeing
n
nt (P/FR)/F)
Textile
inishin
Toray Nylon S i a m Synthetic (N/PF)
To ray Text i le (P/R)
Thai Kurabo (P/ C)
Luckytex (P/C)
Thai Mellon
Polyester
Thai Synthetic (P/C)
Thai American (P/C)
Thai Blanket (P/C. C)
Thai Cotton Mills (C)
iThai a 
tiam Dyeing]
TDT
Marubeni
Source: Suehiro, A., "The Thai Textile
XX-1, January, 1979.
Thai Durable Textile (P/C, C)
Erawan Textile (P/C, C) Tokai Senko
Dusit Textile (P/C, C)
Industry and Japanese Multinational Companies," Asia Economy,
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Toray
TAL
Sukree
47 Ajanant, 1985
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3-5 Determinants of technological development
Why were only large-sized firms able to develop their
technology? Primarily, two reasons are evident. First, large-sized
firms had or obtained a certain amount of capital accumulation. To
export and to improve physical production technologies, producers
needed to purchase new types of weaving machines, such as
shuttleless looms. However, the price of a new shuttleless loom was
ten to fifteen times higher than that of a secondhand loom4 8 .
To meet strict specifications, and to improve such production
skills as process innovation, production control, and punctual
delivery, highly qualified technical and managerial staff was
necessary. There were also dual levels characterizing the quality
of human resources. In large-sized firms, workers had an
educational background of at least seven years primary education,
while many workers in small and medium sized firms were unskilled
laborers coming from rural areas. To train a highly qualified
managerial and technological staff, firms needed a large amount of
capital: "training people for textiles requires big investment in
laboratories and pilot plants; professors and instructors have to
be kept up-to-date with technology and administrative practices and
must be sent abroad regularly. 49
Among large-sized firms, MNCs had large capital resources,
48 Teravaninthorn, 1982
49 Ajanant, 1985
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such as three Japanese textile MNCs in Thailand (Table 3-11).
Several local firms had also saved large amounts of capital, and
could afford to start large-sized business; these firms came from
commercial groups which had historically accumulated capital in
Thailand50. Added to this, large-sized local firms also had a
number of opportunities to obtain financial funds and advanced
technology. Many of these firms received capital and advanced
technology from foreign firms in industrial countries, especially
with Japanese firms. Table 3-12 illustrates the expansion of
textile firms by the two largest textile business groups, Sukree
and Saha Union. For example, when Sukree established the Thai
Blanket Industry, Japanese MNC and trading company owned half of
the capital and provided up-to-date machines from Japan, while
Sukree provided the rest of the capital, land and factories51. As
for Thai American, Japanese MNC and trading company also supported
the technological development of this factory. A French MNC
capitalized 50% of the Thai Melon Polyester Co., Ltd. These firms
also sought capital investors for their family members and the
other firms of their group, and were able to obtain capital from
the Bangkok Bank5 2.
50 Suehiro, 1982.
51 Suehiro, 1980.
5 2 Suehiro, 1989.
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Table 3-13 Industrial Linkage of Sukree and Saha Union
Year Name Business JV firm
Sukree
1964 Thai Blanket Industry
1966 Thai Tricott Co., Ltd
1968 Thai Synthetic Textile
Co.,Ltd.
1969 Thai American Textile
Co.,Ltd.
1970 Siam Dyeing & Printing
Co.,Ltd.
1972 Thai Iryo Co.,Ltd.
1972 Thai Melon Polyester
Co., Ltd.
1979 Thai Li Printing Co., Ltd.
1981 Thai Kree Textile Co.Ltd.
Spinning & Weaving
Cotton
Dyeing
P/C
spinning and weaving
P/C, P/R
spinning and weaving
Dyeing & Printing
Garments
Polyester staple
Japanese textile
JTC
Japanese textile
JTC
Japanese textile
JTC
Japanese textile
JTC
Japanese clothing,
Japanese textile
French textile
Dyeing & Printing
Cotton dyeing
Saha Union
1971 Union Kanebo Spinning
Mills Co, Ltd.Cotton,
(Union Spinning Mills)
1972 Saha Union Corp., Ltd.
1973 Union Thread Industries
1973 Union Olympus Co., Ltd
(Union Novelty Yarn)
Spinning, Weaving
P/C
General trading
Cotton & Synthetic
thread
Embroidery
& crochet thread
Japanese textile
(Withdrew)
TFB
Japanee textile
BBK
1974 Union Knitting Yarn Co.,Ltd Knitting
1974 Union Garment Co., Ltd. Garments
1977 Union Textile Industries, Spinning,Weaving, TFB
Co., Ltd. Dyeing, Bleaching
1978 Texport International Co.,Ltd General Trading
1980- Thai Cotton Enterprise Cotton Cultivation
FTE: Thai Farmer's Bank
BBK: Bangkok Bank
Source: Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Suehiro, A., Capital Accumulation in Thailand, 1989.
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On the other hand, more than 80% of the initial investment
funds small- and medium-sized firms used were self-financed, while
the rest of the funds were raised from relatives and acquaintances.
Since the stock market was not well developed in Thailand, these
smaller businessmen were not able to borrow from the commercial
banks because their credibility was too low53. None of the small-
and medium-sized firms entered into joint ventures with MNCs.
Furthermore, they were not targeted for government support; BOI
only supported those firms with a large percent of exports in total
production and 10 million bahts as preparation for investment in
and purchase of modern machinery (Appendix 1). At that time, both
conditions were impossible for small- and medium- sized firms to
meet. Thus, these smaller firms faced a difficult cycle: they
lacked enough capital to acquire advanced technology; they were
unable to satisfy the requirements for government support, and they
were not able to develop their technology.
Second, small- and medium-sized firms in developing countries
often lacked the sort of business ability that enables firms to
analyze what kind of goods would be in demand in the market,
determine what kind of goods a firm should produce, and with which
companies a firm should contract joint ventures. One of the reasons
for this is that entrepreneurs in developing countries have a
different "concept of quality standards" and "the maximum
permissible limit for defects" (JICA, 1989: I-56). In contrast,
53 Teravaninthorn, 1982.
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large-sized firms had more sophisticated business ability. As shown
in Table 3-12, Sukree obtained advanced production technology by
joint ventures with several Japanese and European textile firms.
For instance, the Thai textile industry experienced a polyester
cotton boom in 1968, and Thai American Textile, in the Sukree
group, determined to take advantage of this boom to expand its
production. This business ability resulted in products that were in
demand. The Sukree group also improved their production and sales
technologies by cooperating with MNCs. In other words, large-sized
local business groups had already accumulated capital, and had
acquired a sense of business ability, which enabled them to obtain
a position of long-term competitiveness.
Figure 3-6 compares the positive cycle experienced by large-
sized firms with the negative cycle experienced by small- and
medium-sized ones. Large-sized firms expanded their production and
improved their technology based on their business abilities and
opportunities to gain financial funding. As a result, they were
able to receive government support. On the other hand, small- and
medium-sized firms lacked the financial resources and information
needed to improve production and sales technologies; they did not
have any opportunity to contract with large-sized firms, and they
did not obtain any information about what kinds of goods were in
demand in the market. As such, they had few opportunities to export
because of their low production technologies and lack of knowledge
about export strategies and channels (interview #20). Since they
did not satisfy conditions for government support, they could not
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Figure 3-6 Positive and Negative Cycles
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acquire any government assistance for exports. Thus, these firms
reduced production, and provided traditional products for sale in
the domestic market, which was protected by tariffs.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter analyzed the industrial competitiveness in the
1960-70s. In this period, the industry was characterized by the
fact that large-sized firms, especially MNCs or Thai large-sized
firms closely related to MNCs, led development of entire textile
industry. Table 3-13 summarizes the technological level of each
type of firm and product.
Table 3-14 Technological Level of Each Type of Firm and Product in the 1970s
Large Small
Standardized High value-added Standardized
Production technology
Machine International Domestic Less developed
Skill International Domestic Less developed
Sales technology International --- Less developed
* International level means the level which firms are able to export to industrialized
countries, while domestic level means the level which firms are able to export only in the
Middle East and Asian developing countries.
The role of the FDI on technological development of the Thai
textile industry was important. Seven largest business groups of
the Thai textile industry were FDI or firms which conducted joint
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venture with MNCs. Based on the analysis of this section, factors
which improved industrial competitiveness in the 1970s were
production technology, sales technology, capital accumulation and
business ability of large-sized firms. FDI supported all of these
factors of their own firms, and supported some factors of local
firms which were closely conneceted with MNCs in advanced
countries, by contracting and creating business linkages with them.
Therefore, also judging from the fact that FDI created these
competitive inter-firm linkages, the role of FDI was extensive in
the development of the Thai textile industry.
Government policy supported the effect of FDI on industiral
development. When FDI started in the 1960s, the government
implemented policies which helped MNCs gain large share in the Thai
domestic market. In the 1970s, BOI supported not only MNCs but also
other local firms of which technologies were not directly supported
by MNCs. The share of production facilities of MNCs and firms
related to these MNCs was approximately 60% in spindles and 22.5-
28% in looms. Based on Table 3-2, the share of BOI promoted firms
exceeds the MNC's share of production facilities. Based on Table 3-
9, there were some large-sized firms all of whose stakeholders were
Thais. The government supported capital accumulation of the rest
of large-sized firms which FDI did not support development of
production technology by investment and export promotion policies
and protection of domestic market (Table 3-2).
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the roles of the
FDI in this period were extensive and the government supported this
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development to extend this competitiveness to the all large-sized
textile firms.
60
4. Clothing Export Expansion: 1980s-present
This chapter examines whether the Thai textile industry has
been competitive based on its relationship with the clothing
industry and ability to meet the needs of clothing industry. It
also discusses whether FDI provided technical leadership or the
government role increased in this period.
As shown in Figure 3-2, the import of man-made fiber fabrics
has increased again through the 1980s, even after completion of
import substitution in the 1970s. This section examines why
consumers of these fabrics, clothing manufacturers, have imported
fabrics, not purchased domestic fabrics by analyzing the
technological level of the Thai textile industry.
4.1 Increases in clothing exports
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the industry has been
characterized by the rapid expansion of its clothing sector. Table
4-1 shows the export value of Thai clothing and textile products.
At the beginning of the 1980s, textile exports were exceeded by
clothing exports, and at present, clothing exports account for
approximately three-fourths of total textile exports. Several
factors led to the increase in Thai clothing exports. The US and EC
countries, which were large importers of Thai textiles, began to
restrict their import volumes in 1974 under the Multi Fiber
Agreement (MFA). When South Korea and Taiwan became internationally
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Table 4-1 Export Performance of Textiles and Clothing, 1972-92
Percent
Total(100%)
Value
240.2
664.4
827.9
1,038.4
1,531.6
1,654.6
2,613.3
3,477.8
4,760.1
6,886.1
7,907.4
8,790.1
12,171.9
14,595.5
20,162.9
36,306.7
46,148.4
60,059.8
66,620.4
87,690.8
89,386.7
91,547.9
103,128.8
40.2
35.9
46.7
55.5
38.2
37.2
38.9
40.3
50.7
55.9
57.8
62.4
64.6
63.1
65.6
72.0
73.5
75.7
74.6
76.3
75.1
74.4
73.1
596.6
1,848.9
1,771.5
1,871.8
4,008.5
4,442.6
6,716.3
8,620.8
9,397.3
12,309.8
13,677.4
14,085.9
18,853.2
23,119.6
30,754.2
50,429.1
62,769.5
79,310.3
89,300.0
114,968.5
119,081.2
123,067.0
141,145.8
Source: Thai Textile Manufacturing Association, Foreign Trade Statistics.
competitive in the 1970s, the MFA favored the Thai textile industry
because its quota restricted further increases in exports from
South Korea and Taiwan. As a result, even though the Thai textile
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Textiles
Value Percent
Clothing
Value
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
350.4
943.6
943.6
833.4
2,476.9
2,788.0
4,103.0
5,143.0
4,637.2
5,423.7
5,770.0
5,295.8
6,681.3
8,524.1
10,591.3
14,122.4
16,621.1
19,250.5
22,679.6
27,277.7
29,694.5
31,519.1
38,017.0
59.8
64.1
53.3
45.5
61.8
62.8
61.1
59.7
49.3
44.1
42.2
37.6
35.4
36.9
34.4
28.0
26.5
24.3
25.4
23.7
24.9
25.6
26.9
(Mil.B, %)
industry could not compete with South Korea and Taiwan, Thai
textile manufacturers were able to increase their export5 4. In
1984, when this quota for Thai fabrics was nearly filled, it became
difficult for Thai weavers to export their products s55. On the other
hand, the MFA clothing quota on Thai products had not been filled.
Simultaneously, South Korea and Taiwan began losing their low-cost
competitive advantage because of the rapid increase in their levels
of wages and the appreciation of their currencies (Table 4-2),
while Thai wage levels was controlled so that they could not
rise56.
Table 4-2 Labor Cost
1980
Comparison, 1980-93
1984 1987
(Un
1990
Japan 4.35 6.28 11.99 13.96
Taiwan 1.26 1.64 2.09 4.56
Hong Kong 1.91 1.65 1.93 3.05
South Korea 0.78 1.89 1.77 3.22
Thailand 0.33 0.56 0.58 0.92
China - 0.26 0.23 0.37
Indonesia - 0.23 0.20 0.25
Source: 1980-87: JICA, 1989.
1990-93: Textile Industry Division, Ministry of Industry in Thailand.
it:US$/hour)
1993
23.65
5.76
3.85
3.66
1.04
0.36
0.43
Given these circumstances clothing exporting firms in Taiwan
and Hong Kong shifted their production facilities to Thailand to
54 Suphachalasai, 1990, Hirose, Y, 1991.
55 Mitsubishi Trading Company, 1988.
56 Yoshioka, 1987.
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take advantage of its low-wage levels. This new wave of FDI
triggered the export expansion of the Thai clothing industry.
Table 4-3 Production and Export Value of Clothing, 1980-93
(Mil. Bahts, %)
Production
14,072
26,917
45,599
61,322
98,077
Export
4,980
12, 628
37,111
66,620
91,547
Export to DCs
72.0
74.3
58.1
58.0
58.2
Export to LDCs
28.0
25.7
41.9
42.0
41.8
* Export data is shown by FOB price, ar
the Thai domestic market.
Source: Thai Textile Manufacturing Association
id production data is based on prices in
Consequently in the 1980s, most Thai clothing manufacturers
directed their attention to the international market. Table 4-3
shows the value of clothing production and exports from 1980 to
present. This table illustrates that Thai manufacturers
consistently progressed toward supplying international markets
throughout the 1980s. Table 4-3 further shows the share of
destination of the Thai clothing exports. Although the share of
developed countries has not increased rapidly because of the MFA,
the export shares to developed countries, such as the US, the
countries in the EC , and Japan, has remained higher than for
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1980
1984
1987
1990
1993
developing countries. This means that Thai clothing manufacturers
have needed to improve the quality of their products in order to
compete in the international marketplace.
In the 1990s, however, the Thai textile and clothing
industries have been facing serious problems concerning wage
increases. Based on Table 4-2, wage difference ratio between China
and Thailand (Thai wages divided by Chinese wages) increased from
2.52 in 1984 to 2.89 in 1993. Thus, the Thai clothing industry now
needs to obtain strong "long-term competitiveness" to deal with
wage increase and remain competitive in a long-run.
For the clothing sector to maintain its competitiveness over
the long run, industrial linkage with the textile sector is vital.
How quickly and constantly a clothing manufacturer can procure its
materials often influences its ability to remain competitive,
especially since clothing designers constantly have to be
responsive to and remain in advance of fashionable trends which:
"... determine the nature of yarn used (fiber
content, spun or filament, bulky or not, etc.), the
construction of the fabric (light, heavy, plain, fancy,
etc.), and finishing (shiny, dull, soft, hard dyed,
printed, etc.) In finishing, dyeing and printing will
have different trends in different seasons: light shades
or dark shades, big prints or small prints, and motives:
geometric, floral and etc. Generally, fashion is created
18 months before the finished product (fabric or
garment) reaches the consumer" (Ajanant, 1985:18).
Thus, stylists, designers, spinners, weavers, and dyestuff
manufacturers are all actively involved in the clothing production
process. In other words, an integrated production system from
spinning, weaving, dyeing and clothing is necessary for clothing
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producers to be competitive and, consequently, clothings' long-term
competitiveness depends on the competitiveness of the spinning and
weaving sectors and the industrial linkage between these two
sectors.
Table 4-4 Export Share of Clothing Products in the 1980s (%)
1980 1984 1987
Womens' products
- Sweaters, women's, 16.04 16.91 19.94
girls' & infant dresses
- Dressers, skirts, 39.27 40.09 39.93
blouses, sarongs
- Women's, girls' & 2.57 3.17 2.09
infant' shirts
- Women's overcoats,
suits, trousers, jackets
Socks & stockings 0.2 0.3 0.4
Shirts, pantyhose, 4.81 6.83 6.95
undergarments
Men's & boys shirts 14.38 12.87 10.70
& undergarments
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics
In particular, when manufacturers are involved in women's
clothing, fashion and season determine the competitiveness of their
clothing products57 . Table 4-4 shows the share of each type of
clothing in total exports for Thailand. Share of women's clothing
is highest when compared to other types of products. Therefore, for
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57 Cairns, 1981.
Thai clothing export goods to be competitive in the international
market over the long run, "long-term competitiveness" of the Thai
textile industry is necessary.
Table 4-5 Procurement of Materials of Large-sized Firms at the end
of the 1980s (%)
Firms almost 100% import ratios 10.5
Firms with 50% or more import ratios 21.1
Firms with less than 50% import ratios 31.6
Firms with almost 100% domestic procurement 28.9
Unknown 7.9
Source: JICA, 1989.
However, the Thai clothing industry has not necessarily
promoted the industrial linkage with textile industry. Table 4-5
shows the result of the JICA survey regarding the procurement of
large-sized clothing firms. Consequently, through the 1980s,
although the export production ratio of fabric and clothing
increased, the import domestic-demand ratio of man-made fabrics did
not decrease (Figure 3-2). According to clothing exporters, the
reasons why they do not use domestic materials are (1) the quality
is too low to export to the international market, and (2) the
materials they want are not produced in Thailand58. Based on this
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58 JICA, 1989.
information, it is possible to say that fabric producers have not
necessarily produced what the domestic market demands. Increase in
clothing production is not strongly linked to increases in textile
production. Thus, from the viewpoint of the clothing industry, the
Thai textile industry is not strongly competitive because of
shortage of high quality goods and lack of variety. This suggests
that as the level of wage further increases in the future, the Thai
textile industry will lose industrial competitiveness.
Table 4-6 Import Components of Man-made Fabrics in the 1990s (%)
Amount Value
1990 1994 1990 1994
Staple fiber bleached/unbleached 28.5 30.4 19.0 25.3
- P/C bleached/unbleached plain 18.7 8.2 11.3 7.5
Staple fiber dyed 5.9 1.9 8.9 4.1
- P/C dyed plain 3.8 0.5 6.3 1.0
Filament 46.0 58.7 55.7 56.3
- 85%/more polyester filament 21.0 13.6 21.5 25.8
- Filament dyed 20.0 38.1 25.5 19.1
- 85%/more Nylon/other 17.2 36.1 21.5 14.8
polymides dyed
T/R 10.1 5.6 6.4 5.6
Man-made fabrics 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(Excludes Knitting)
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics, 1990 and 1994.
In the next section, in trying to ascertain why both
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industries are not linked, I suggest that the textile sector did
not improve its long-term competitiveness especially in terms of
industrial linkage with the clothing sector in the 1980s. Table 4-6
shows the components of import fabrics in 1990 and 1994. Increases
in imports of man-made fabrics can be classified not only as those
classified as high value-added, such as filament and dyed fabrics
but also standardized fabrics, such as P/C and plain weaves. I
discuss why these two kinds of products have problems of quality
and variety from the viewpoint of technological development.
Furthermore, I discuss what extent FDI played a role in improving
industrial competitiveness. In the sixth section, I analyze the
role of the government in this period.
4.2 Technological level of standardized goods
Although production of standard fabrics expanded, the share
of goods which had only "short-term competitiveness" increased
rather than goods which had "long-term competitiveness." The
primary factor influencing the expansion of textile production in
Thailand was an expansion of clothing production, especially as it
related to small- and medium-sized textile firms which were able to
reverse the previous decline in their businesses and increase their
share of production. Share of spun fabrics production facilities of
small- and medium-sized firms increased to 45.7% in 1994 from
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35.6%59 in 1979.
However, the fabric export share of small- and medium-sized
firms has not expanded, since they were not able to acquire MFA
quotas, which large-sized firms had already obtained and
fulfilled60. Table 4-7 shows the number of exporting firms of
weaving and clothing industries. Compared to clothing, the number
of large-sized exporting fabric firms is more than small-sized
ones. These factors indicate how production expansion of small- and
medium-sized firms was connected to increases in clothing
production.
Table 4-7 Number of Exporting Firms in Fabrics (spun yarn) and
Clothing Sectors in the 1990s
Clothing Fabrics (spun yarn)
Large-sized firms 47 (85.4%) 18 (66.7%)
Medium-sized firms 20 (51.3%)
Small-sized firms 47 (38.8%) 1 (0.9%)
* Textile large sized firms includes member of TTMA, the others are
categorized as small- and medium-sized firms listed in Production Facilities,
Japanese Chamber of Commerce, 1994 or listed as a member of TWIA.
** Figure is number of registered firms listed as "exporting companies" in the
government record.
*** % presents the share of total number of firms for each category.
Source: Japanese Chamber of Commerce, 1994.
Thailand Export Monitor, 1991-92, Alpha Research
Board of Trade of Thailand, Export & Import Directory, 1992-93.
However, does this mean that small- and medium-sized weaving
59 Japanese Chamber of Commerce, 1994.
6 0Mitsubishi Trading Companies
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firms will be able to maintain their industrial competitiveness
even when wages increase? The answer is NO. These firms have never
been able to match the high quality goods produced by the
integrated spinning and weaving facilities of large-sized firms.
Judging from the situation observed regarding the
yarn break number in the fine spinning process and the
uneveness of yarn showing in warping at the weaving
plant, the quality of yarn was generally good. This is
probably due to the selection of certain quality cotton
and the effect of blending (JICA, 1989).
However, only integrated spinning firms with weaving
factories produced yarn which could be used with advanced machines,
such as high speed and high density air jet looms and circular
knitting machines. Most of these yarn products were delivered to
their own large-sized weaving factories. Individual weaving firms
were not able to purchase such yarns, therefore, even if they
introduced air jet looms, the yarn they purchased could not be used
with such advanced machines61.
Furthermore, small- and medium-sized firms did not develop
their "production skills." They were not able to obtain any
production skills which enabled them to conduct R&D and establish
technical knowhow. Some member firms of TWIA introduced
shuttleless looms based on sales increases brought about by
expansion of clothing production: "because of expansion of
clothing products, we could find the market and accumulate our
capital." (interview #21).- They said, "we are trying to improve our
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61 JICA, 1989.
products' quality. Because of wage increases, consumers'
expectations are changing; they expect us to diversify products,
and improve quality." (interview #21) However, their ability to
utilize modern machinery is not as developed as that of large-
sized firms: " we cannot trust the product quality of small- and
medium- sized firms, because when we visited their factories it
was apparent that their production systems were not as good as
those of large-sized firms" (interview #22).
These factors explain why, even though the textile industry
expanded production, the product quality of small- and medium-
sized firms, which expanded their share of total weaving
production, did not improve.
Furthermore, this production expansion was not related to
improvement of machinery in the entire textile industry. Table 4-8
shows labor productivity, average value of machinery, and sales
value per worker of weaving firms which have more than twenty
workers. Because of production increases in clothing, textile
firms increased their sales and labor productivities. However, the
value of machinery declined after it peaked in 1984. Therefore,
although product sales increased, the level of their physical
production technology did not improve during the second half of
the 1980s.
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...most of the equipment used for the mass
production of 20'S-40's has not been renewed since the
plants were first established due to surplus production
by manufacturers of standard products and the pressure
which this surplus has put on the market
price...Although standard spun yarn using this sort of
equipment may be acceptable for the domestic market and
for export to the Middle East which is not so stringent,
there is the danger of being subject to claims if the
yarn is exported to Japan where the requirements
regarding quality are stricter.(JICA, 1989).
Table 4-8 Labor Productivity, Average Value of
Sales Value per Worker, 1979-91
Machinery for Each Firm, and
Labor productivity
217.0
287.0
377.5
377.5
499.8
563.2
Value of machinery
30173.2
56565.1
120360.8
94642.7
39509.6
81713.5
Sales value/worker
176.7
267.1
326.3
364.0
407.6
484.1
* 20 less presents firms which employ less than 20 workers, and
presents firms which employ 20 workers and more.
** value of machinery shows average value of machinery per firm.
20 more
Source: 1979-1984: National Statistical Office, Report of the 1980, 1983, and 1985 Industrial
Census Whole Kingdom.
1986-1991: National Statistical Office, Report of the 1987, 1990 and 1992 Industrial
Survey Bangkok Metropolis, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani and Samut Prakan.
In conclusion, from the viewpoint of clothing manufacturers,
long-term competitiveness of the standardized weaving production
was not highly improved during the 1980s. In particular, small- and
medium-sized firms did not acquire any substantial form of long-
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term competitiveness. Based on the fact that small- and medium-
sized firms expanded the share of domestic weaving production
facilities, while MNCs did not, I conclude that the weaving
industry did not improve its technology sufficiently to be
competitive over the long-run. Table 4-9 summarizes the
technological development of each type of firm compared with the
1970s (Table 3-1-2).
Table 4-9 Technological Development of Each type of Firm and Product in the
1980-90s
Large Small
Standardized High value-added Standardized
Production technology
Machine Unchanged Unchanged Domestic
Skill Unchanged Unchanged Domestic
Sales technology Unchanged --- Domestic
In the 1980s, the technological levels required in the
international clothing market declined not because of lowered
standards of quality but because Thai wage levels remained low,
especially when compared to the rise in wages in South Korea and
Taiwan. Therefore, even if Thai weaving technology did not advance,
Thai woven products were consumed by clothing exporters.
However, this delay in technological development
simultaneously resulted in increases in imports of standard
products which were already produced in Thailand, because there was
an increased need for high quality fabrics among clothing exporters
74
(4.1). According to Table 4-10, the imports of staple fiber (SF)
fabrics had been increasing even when domestic weaving had a
problem of oversupply in the first half of the 1980s. Especially,
increases in imports of SF fabrics mixed with cotton, including P/C
fabrics, evidence that competitive improvements in the Thai weaving
sector were delayed. Therefore, the reason for the increase in
imports of standard products can be attributed to a shortage of
goods produced by advanced technologies.
Table 4-10 Changes of Import Components of Man-made Fabrics, 1980-92
First row: Mil.sqy, Mil. Bahts
Second row: growth rate, %
SF fabrics Filament fabrics
SF total mixed with cotton
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value
1980 14.1 183.0 10.8 138.0 112.2 1,432.0
1984 34.6 780.7 26.8 598.7 80.2 1,400.7
(145.4) (326.6) (129.6) (333.8) (-26.7) ( -2.2)
1988 127.9 1,708.6 52.5 815.6 108.5 1,837.5
(269.7) (118.6) ( 95.9) ( 36.2) (35.3) ( 31.2)
1990 158.4 2,651.3 76.8 1,080.0 160.7 3,333.0
1992 235.0 4,163.4 83.5 1,544.5 179.4 11,692.0
( 83.7) (143.7) ( 59.5) ( 89.4) (65.3) (536.3)
* SF: staple fiber
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics, 1980,1984,1988,1990, and 1992.
4.3 Lack of diversification
The second problem of the Thai textile industry is that it
has iot sufficiently diversified its products to meet the domestic
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demand from clothing manufacturers. Diversification is defined as
textile firms adopting production strategies that are based on
producing various kinds of high value-added goods rather than
concentrating on a few kinds of standard products manufactured on
economies of scale. Diversified production requires more production
skill than mass production systems.
Table 4-11 Components of Export Fabrics in 1990
Export goods 1990
Amount Value
P/C 41.3 50.0
- P/C unbleached/bleached plain 24.9 23.8
- other P/C plain 10.4 20.7
Polyester staple fiber 23.0 29.1
- bleached/unbleached 1.2 1.8
P/R 8.3 17.7
Filament 8.0 12.4
Man-made fabrics 100.0 100.0
Source: Thai Foreign Trade Statistics, 1990
Table 4-12 Nature of Business in Large-sized Firms in the 1990s
(Number,could be plural)
Cotton P/C Spun Rayon (P/R) Polyester Nylon Total
38 27 13 7 2 72
(52.8%) (37.5%) (18.1%) (9.7%) (2.8%) (100.0%)
Source: Thai Garment Manufacturing Association, 1992.
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Table 4-13 Nature of Business of TWIA Firms in the 1990s
(Number, could be plural)
Grey Sarongs Yarn dyed Cotton net Dyed Other Total
TWIA 111 25 51 34 8 23 230
(48.3%) (10.9%) (22.2) (14.8) (3.5%) (10.0%) (100.0%)
Other mainly includes standardized fabrics, such as shirting.
Source: Thai Garment Manufacturing Association, 1992.
Since filament and its dyed weaving have held the largest
share in Thai textile imports (Table 4-6), discussion concentrates
on these two types of weaving. Table 4-11 shows the components of
export fabrics in 1990. The share of bleached or unbleached P/C
fabrics is still high. Judging that almost all exporting firms are
large-sized, those firms which had relatively advanced technologies
did not diversify their products. Based on my interview with a
local large-sized textile firm, its main product is still occupied
by grey fabrics as of 1994 (interview #18). Many domestic producers
concentrated on manufacturing standard polyester staple fiber
products. Table 4-12 shows the nature of business of large-sized
weaving firms in 1992. Share of standardized products is far higher
than that of filament weaving. Table 4-13 shows the nature of
businesses of small- and medium-sized weaving firms. The major
products of small and medium- sized firms are also standardized
fabrics.
The technology for producing polyester filament yarn has not
been developed in Thailand. Only a few MNCs produce various kinds
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of filament yarns, while most firms concentrate on production of
POY (partially oriented yarn)62. As for the dyeing sector, capacity
in Thailand is unable to meet demand. Table 4-14 compares the
amount of production of dyeing fabrics in the 1980s. The domestic
dyeing industry did not develop from 1983 to 1988. As a result by
1988, dyed filament weaving production could not meet the domestic
demand. Large-sized integrated firms have their own advanced dyeing
facilities, but they are used only for their products, which are
standardized ones. Among members of TTMA, nineteen firms had dyeing
facilities, but only 5 firms had filament dyeing facilities in
1990.
Table 4-14 Comparison of Dyeing, Printing and Finishing Fabrics Between Import
and Domestic Production, 1979-88 (Mil.sqy)
1979 1983 1988 1988
Production Production Production Import M/X
C, P/C 786.0 1,146.0 1,200.0 56.2 0.05
Filament 28.8 180.0 192.0 64.5 33.6
Source: Japanese Chamber of Commerce, 1994
Foreign Trade Statistics, 1988.
The reasons why diversification of textile products did not
develop in the weaving sector are attributable to three factors.
First, demand in the domestic market did not match that in the
international market. The domestic market has not had much demand
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62 JICA, 1989.
for filament fabrics (interview #11). Because of the warm climate,
Thai people have favored spun fabrics, which are washable and
comfortable to wear in hot weather. Moreover, people in lower
income brackets did not favor as people in industrialized countries
filament products which were higher priced than spun woven ones. On
the other hand, consumers in industrialized countries purchased
various kinds of goods including high value-added goods. Second,
Thai textile firms did not have sufficient production skills. It is
difficult to master the technology of needed to produce filament
fabrics. According to one MNC interviewed, "It took three years to
produce high quality filament fabrics since I came here. (interview
#19)" To produce filament products, preparation for this knowhow
requires the proper machinery, vast amounts of yarn, and specific
production skills. Production of filament requires the development
of technology at all stages, such as
"the development of filament yarn for WJL weaving
by fiber producers, the development of warping system or
warp sizing system by weaving plants, the development of
special sizing, inspection of uneven dyeability at the
beginning of weaving, and the incorporation of the
weight reduction process by dyeing plants." (JICA, 1989)
The Dyeing sector can be also pointed out the shortage of
production skills
"...in the dyeing sector improvements in production
management were more important than improvements in the
production facilities themselves." Because "Product
development in the textile and apparel industries
requires not only improvement of existing production
facilities but also accumulation of know-how in the
dyeing and finishing processes such as "feel" and
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"touch. (JICA, 1989: I-118)"
Third, financial problems related to the introduction of new
machinery needs to be noted. One key reason why firms did not
introduce modern machinery was the expense63. Both the appreciation
of the yen and high price on textile machines made it difficult for
firms to purchase new equipment, although modern machines increase
productivity 64.
As for dyeing facilities, there was little movement to expand
and/or renew equipment until the beginning of the 1990s, primary
because of government policies.
Due to the poor quality of domestically produced
dyes, dyers are forced to use imported dyes. However,
import tariffs and surcharges increase the cost by an
additional 50% or so... Because the products are
standard fabric, orders come from Sam Peng. This means
that even though products might ultimately be exported,
dyes do not receive export certificates because their
products are exported indirectly. Dyers have a surplus
in equipment capacity (JICA, 1989).
Finally, because fluctuating costs account for between 60-70%
of total costs, fixed costs have to be kept down as much as
possible6 5 .
63 JICA, 1989.
64 JICA, 1989.
65 JICA, 1989.
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4.4 Effect of FDI on industrial competitiveness
FDI was not the main contributor to the technological
development in this period. Compared to 1979 as shown in Table 3-
7, the share of weaving production facilities by FDI has been
further reduced compared to the 1970s: share of FDI's spun fabrics
declined to 12.9% in 1994 from 18.7% in 197966. Table 4-15
illustrates production expansion of six large-sized Japanese
weaving MNCs6 7. Japanese MNCs' growth rate of production is largely
exceeded by that of local firms. Small- and medium-sized firms,
which expanded production, were not related to MNCs; small- and
medium-sized firms did not contract with any MNCs (Chapter 3).
Table 4-15 Production Change of Japanese MNCs from 1979 to 1992 (Mil.sqy)
1979 1992 Growth rate(%)
Japanese MNCs 225.6 255.6 13.3
Total weaving firms 1,424.1 3,360.6 136.0
Source: Japanese Chamber of Commerce, List of Japanese multinational companies, (Nikkei kigyo
Meibo) 1979 and 1992.
FDI did not play key role in diversification either. The
amount of production of high value-added goods which were produced
66 Japanese Chamber of Commerce, 1994.
67 This table shows transition of seven of eleven large-sized cotton and man-made
weaving firms which were established in the 1960-70s and of which Japanese MNCs still mainly
participate in management in 1990.
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by MNCs was not adequate to meet the needs of clothing exporters.
Although some of ECs could improve their products by starting to
produce high-value added goods, it was only one type of
contribution that could be made. Regarding textile goods, where
the transfer of production technology occurred depended on the
global strategy of the headquarters of the multinational company.
For example, Teijin headquarters in Japan withdrew their
management from weaving production in all of their subsidiaries
worldwide during the early 1980s, thereby stopping the transfer of
advanced T/R and filament weaving technology.
4.5 Industrial linkage and FDI
Based on the fact that the domestic textile industry did not
achieve the competitiveness needed to supply sufficient input
materials for the Thai clothing industry, the Thai clothing
industry has not developed the industrial linkage with textile
sector to be competitive in a long run. The reason for the
incoherence among these sectors is evident in the institutional
structure of the Thai textile industry, which historically has
lacked linkage between its clothing and textile sectors. There are
few industrial linkages between these two sectors in Thailand;
local business groups have created several linkages. Saha Union
and Sukree weaving firms deliver their products to their clothing
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factories68. However, there is no other linkage between fabrics and
clothing manufacturers in Thailand, whether the companies are
MNCs, or small- and medium-sized Thai firms. Unlike the linked
yarn and fabric producers, most MNCs have no direct connection
with the clothing sector.
Table 4-16 shows the share of clothing firms which entered
into joint venture with foreign textile MNCs, and firms belonging
to local business groups and their total production facilities in
1994. Although some of the middle-sized firms belong to local
business groups, 92.9 percent of clothing firms do not have a
direct relationship with a textile firm.
Table 4-16 Share of Each Type of Clothing Firm in Production Facilities in
1994 upper row: number of sewing machine
lower row: percentage of total
Foreign textile MNCs Local textile business group Total
4,600 7,975 178,619
(2.6%) (4.5%) (100.0%)
Source: Japanese Chamber of Commerce, 1994.
These facts indicate that except for a few large, local
business groups, none of the MNCs created industrial linkages
between the textile and clothing sectors, nor is there strong
linkage between the clothing and weaving sectors. Instead, the
multinational textile firms export most of their products.
Furthermore, in this period, some Japanese multinational companies
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68 Suehiro, 1979.
started to enact global strategies and use their own intercompany
linkages. At times, they imported yarns from their subsidiaries in
other countries so that their strategies moved beyond the linkages
of the Thai textile industry. For example, the Toray group has a
global strategy to rationalize processes within a group. Luckytex
purchases 570 ton of its staple fibers from the Toray branch in
Malaysia, 350 ton of polyester filament from Toray Fiblers Ltd. in
Thailand, and 1.7 million square yard of grey fabrics to be dyed
from the Toray factory in Indonesia (interview #14). Based on the
fact that Luckytex exports 70% of its woven production, this firm
concentrates on woven production for export rather than production
of input materials for clothing exports (interview #14). Thai
Garment Export, which belongs to the Toray-TAL group, import 80%
of input materials through their global network (interview#17).
Table 4-17 Sales Route of Large-sized Textile Firms
(number of firms)
Spinning Weaving
FDI/JV Local FDI/JV Local
Domestic sales
- firm in 6 2 1 0
their group
- San Pen 0 0 4 3
Export ratio 0 20-25% 3:40-45% 1:40%
1: 20% 1: 0%
1: unknown 1: unknown
Source: JICA, 1989.
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MNCs also brought their products to San Pen market. Most of
the fabrics and yarns are sold to garment manufacturers through
San Pen and then exported; 70% of the products sold in San Pen are
supplied to garment manufacturers. San Pen also serves as the key
supply base for imported fabrics needed by garment manufacturers.
Based on JICA surveys6 9, save for one firm, transaction routes are
fixed, and sales routes for domestic markets operate through San
Pen (Table 4-17).
None of the textile firms JICA surveyed conducted direct
transactions with garment manufacturers. Small- and medium-sized
weaving firms have also delivered their products to San Pen since
the 1960s7 0. Therefore, all MNCs and small- and medium-sized
weaving firms producing for domestic market delivered their
products to San Pen. However, San Pen did not analyze demand in
the international market and did not have any information what
kind of fabrics Thai clothing manufactures demanded7l. Thus market-
side demands of fabric for clothing did not reach the product
development process of fabrics and yarns. In other words, clothing
manufacturers never exchanged information with domestic weavers
about demands in the international market, and domestic producers
of woven goods continued to produce what the San Pen market would
accept.
69 JICA, 1989.
70 Japaneses Chamber of Commerce
71 JICA, 1989.
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4.6 Role of the government
In the 1980s, the effect of the government on improving
industrial competitiveness of the Thai textile industry was
limited. Despite of delay of technological development in
especially local small- and medium-sized firms, the government did
not implement policies to spread the advanced technology which
MNCs already obtained in Thailand.
Moreover, the government was not concerned about shortage of
industrial linkages between clothing and textile industries.
Figure 4-1 shows the expected effect of government export
promotion policies in the 1980s. There was incoherence among
policies implemented by each ministry. The Ministry of Finance
(MOF) protected the domestic market by imposing high tariffs.
Simultaneously, MOI restricted the number of production facilities
in the first half of the decade because of the problem of
oversupply (chapter 3). These protections effected the cost
competitiveness of Thai standardized textile goods. The standard
count of spun yarns of pure cotton (100%), C.V.C., T/C or T/R was
not cost-competitive internationally; even with tariff
protections, imported goods from China were less expensive than
Thai domestic goods; in the second half of 1987 the Thai market
price for T/C 45'S was 54-57 Baht/lb compared to a tax inclusive
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Figure 4-1 Negative Cycle of Government Policy in the 1980s
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price of 51 Baht/lb for yarn imported from China72.
On the other hand, the government, including BOI, directed
its attention only toward export promotion, and exempted import
tariffs on input materials for exporters. When clothing exports
began to occupy a large share of domestic clothing production in
the 1980s, tariff protection was not as effective as believed, see
Table 4-1873.
Table 4-18 Effective Rates of Assistance for the Textile and
Clothing Industries in 1985 (%)
All sales Domestic sales Export sales
Weaving 6.5 6.3 8.2
Clothing -6.1 -9.8 5.0
Source: Suphachalasai, "Thailand's growth in textile exports," in New Silk Roads: East Asia
and World Textile Markets, ed. by Anderson K., 1994.
As clothing exports increased, these incoherent government
policies were not effective in promoting development of domestic
textile industries. For clothing exporters which used high-value
added fabrics, who obtained an exemption of import tariffs of
their input materials, it was possible either to import fabrics or
purchase them in the domestic market. For users of standardized
fabrics, it might be more profitable to purchace less expensive
Chinese goods. In other words, government policies did not promote
72 JICA, 1989.
73 Suphachalasai, 1994.
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linkage between the clothing and the weaving sectors. Until
present, because of the low wage levels, the Thai textile industry
remained competitive. However, with the extension of wage
differences from Indonesia and China (Table 4-2), the Thai textile
industry has been losing competitiveness based on those countries
lower wage levels. Furthermore, considering that the long-term
competitiveness of the weaving industry is doubtful, the import of
weaving is expected to increase further in the future.
4.7 Conclusion
This section examined whether the textile and clothing
sectors improved their long-term competitiveness during the 1980s.
In this period, the textile industry did not produce sufficient
high quality input materials to meet the needs of the clothing
sector. This fact suggests that the Thai textile industry will
lose competitiveness in the future as the level of its wage
increases. The reasons were (1) the shortage of technological
development such as the production skills necessary to create high
value-added products, and the lack of modern machines which could
produce standardized products, and (2) the lack of industrial
linkage between the weaving and the clothing sectors.
Although MNCs had high industrial competitiveness, the role
of FDI in industrial competitiveness of the weaving sector
declined. The share of firms related to MNCs declined and MNCs did
not create industrial linkage with clothing industry. Unlike in
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the 1970s, the government did not play supplementary role; the
government protection for domestic textile industry was not high;
it did not spread MNC's advanced technology to local firms; it did
not create the linkage between textile and clothing industries.
Next section provides summarizes the analysis about he role of
the FDI and the government in the development of the Thai textile
industry, and suggests what the government should have done to
connect high competitiveness of MNCs to the entire industrial
development.
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5. The Role of FDI and the Government
This chapter summarizes the effect of FDI and the government
on technological development in the Thai textile industry. The
previous chapters conclude that the government supported the role
of FDI for the Thai textile industry to be competitive in the
1960-70s, while, in the 1980s, FDI's role was limited and the
government did not implement policies to keep competitiveness in a
long run. This chapter also discusses how the government should
have supported the role of the FDI on improvement of "long-term"
competitiveness in the Thai textile industry.
5.1 Development processes of the Thai textile industry
Figure 5-1 summarizes the development processes of the Thai
textile industry. During the import substitution period of the
1960s, the industry obtained short-term competitiveness based on
its low wage levels. Both FDI and the government actively promoted
import substitution. In the fabric export expansion period of the
1970s, MNCs and large business groups acquired long-term
competitiveness at the level of the firm. Production was
concentrated on standard fabrics using lower count yarns produced
in response to Thai domestic demand. The government supported
large-sized firms to export these standardized goods. At that
time, the Thai textile industry imported only what domestic
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manufacturers did not produce. However, in the clothing export
expansion period of the 1980s, to supply a variety of input
materials needed to meet the new demand of clothing manufacturers,
the Thai textile industry hd to increase its ability to produce a
diversity of high quality fabrics. Clothing manufacturers now
needed to procure high quality fabrics because the criteria
demanded by international markets which were higher than those of
the Thai domestic market. However, although technological
development was delayed during this period, even without advanced
technology, the Thais were able to expand their production because
of increases in low-priced clothing production. Consequently, in
the 1980s, small- and medium-sized firms expanded their
production, while most of the large-sized firms continued to
produce standard products. The number of imported fabrics grew
because of domestic shortages in a variety of high value-added
fabrics and low quality goods continued to be produced by small-
and medium-sized firms (chapter 4).
In the 1970s, the competitiveness of the Thai textile
industry was determined by the technological levels of large-sized
firms that were competitive. In the 1980s, production concentrated
on standard goods, and only large-sized firms used advanced
technology. However, as industry develops, production needs to
expand and diversify, and ever more advanced technology is
required to fuel this development. In the 1980s, firms needed
either to adopt to technological development based on economies of
scale rather than production skills or to incorporate development
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based on sophisticated production skills rather than on mass
production methods74. For the entire textile industry, to remain
competitive it was important to understand how the industry
produced a large number and a variety of products. This factor
also led related industries, such as the clothing sector, to be
competitive in the long run by constantly providing competitive
input materials. Therefore, for the Thai textile industry to be
competitive in the 1980s, all Thai textile firms, not only large-
sized ones, should have introduced up-to-date machines and
mastered production skills. Furthermore, at this stage, firms
needed to know what kinds of goods the market demanded. Under
conditions of severe competition in the international market,
knowledge of market situations is vital to reduce the risk of
investment. Therefore, the Thai textile industry should have
linked itself to the Thai clothing industry so that they would
have known what kinds of goods the domestic clothing manufacturers
needed. The next section summarizes the role of the Thai
government and FDI in the industrial development of Thai textiles.
5.2 The role of FDI and the Thai government in long-term
competitiveness: at the firm level
FDI and the government played key roles in industrial
development in the 1970s, because both promoted technological
development of large-sized firms. Based on the previous
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74 See Chapter 1
discussion, I analyzed the role of FDI and the government in the
1970s as follows. Figure 5-1 also shows the factors which brought
technological development to Thai textile MNCs and large-sized
local firms in the 1970s. Within multinational firms and local
large-sized firms which contracted joint ventures with MNCs,
initially, MNCs supported all aspects of technological development
by providing advanced machinery, investment capital and high
quality human resources. Within local large-sized firms which
foreign trading companies were stakeholders, these trading
companies supported capital accumulation and development of sales
technology. The government supported capital accumulation in all
types of large-sized firms, including local large-sized firms
which foreign firms did not participate, by advocating export
promotion policies and protecting domestic market. The government
also promoted localization of human resources by restricting
foreign workers' visas (chapter 2). Table 5-1 shows the number of
Japanese and Thai workers in Japanese MNCs and local large-sized
firms that had entered into joint ventures with Japanese firms.
Technology transfer in MNCs has begun to proceed.
The difference between MNCs and large-sized local firms is
that while MNCs plan their competitive strategies based on the
MC's business abilities, local firms in joint ventures do so
based on the business abilities of local firms. Large-sized local
firms had their own style of doing business. Therefore, FDI
replaced Thai business abilities in FDI-run firms, but business
procedures were determined by Thai business approaches by firms
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that entered into joint ventures.
Table 5-1 Number of Japanese and Thai Managers & Workers in BOI Promoted Firms
First row: 1978
Second row:1990
Joint Venture J.Managers J. Factory Thais managers Total Thais
7 24 23 26 7,152
20 7 44 7,523
Foreign Direct Investment
10 52 108 36 10,693
54 67 45 27,455
* Include Hong Kong workers
Source: Japanese Chamber of Commerce
On the other hand, FDI and the government were not the main
contributors to expansion of production in he 1980s. In this
period, the technological development of both large-sized and
small-sized firms was important for the textile industry to remain
competitive, because the production of small- and medium-sized
firms was also expanding. The expansion in production by small- and
medium-sized weaving firms was not related to FDI. Judging from the
analysis in chapter 4, their expansion of production resulted,
instead, from production expansion in the clothing sector rather
than their ability to develop technologically. As such, it is
doubtful whether small- and medium-sized weaving firms could
achieve long-term competitiveness.
Moreover, diversification of textile products also became a
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key factor affecting competitiveness of the Thai textile industry.
However, FDI did not necessarily play a major role in advanced
technology transfers, which were used for the production of high
value-added goods (Chapter 4). Local business groups which already
broke contract joint ventures did not obtain advanced technology
from MNCs, and these local firms have not even started to produce
high value-added goods (chapter 4).
The government did not implement policies to promote
technological development of firms with less advanced technologies
or spread advanced technologies of MNCs.
5.3 The role of FDI in long-term competitiveness:industrial linkage
The effect of FDI in creating competitive industrial linkage
differed between the 1970s and the 1980s. In the 1970s, MNCs
created a number of linkages within the Thai textile industry. Most
MNCs controlled the entire manufacturing process, including fiber,
spinning, weaving and dyeing; and, cheir products were also
delivered to other company groups (chapter 3). Based on this incer-
firm linkage, MNCs provided raw materials for fabrics, such as
staple fiber, to local large-sized firms. However, industrial
linkage within the Thai textile sector was created among only
large-sized firms which had adequate financial resources and
entrepreneurship to create this linkage. As for small-sized firms,
their industrial structure was partially effected in response to
conditions at San Pen. Small-sized spinning firms produced yarn and
97
fabrics without understanding what kinds of goods and demands the
domestic market demanded. In this period, small- and medium-sized
firms reduced their production because they lost to large-sized
firms (chapter 3).
In the 1980s, the Thai textile industry needed to expand its
industrial linkage to obtain long-term competitiveness, in
particular the linkages between the textile and clothing sectors,
and to further join small- and medium-sized firms to these
networks. However, FDI did not promote increased industrial
linkage. In this period, some Japanese MNCs started to enact global
strategies and use their own intercompany linkages, such as Toray.
Their stragtegies moved beyond the linkages of the Thai textile
industry (Chapter 4).
FDI did not affect the industrial linkage of small- and
medium-sized weaving firms and clothing manufacturers. Moreover,
small- and medium-sized firms did not even obtain information
concerning what clothing manufactures demanded.
5.4 The role of the government: at the level of industrial
structure
Based on the analyses in the previous sections, FDI did not
have effect of promoting technological development for the entire
textile industry in Thailand: the effect of FDI on technological
development was limited to MNCs and local firms which contracted
joint ventures or technological cooperation with them. As a
result, with increases in the level of wage, other Thai textile
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firms have had problems of upgrading its quality and diversifying
products. For the entire Thai textile industry to be competitive
in the long run, government support is necessary.
Therefore, the role of the government at the level of
industrial structure is to spread the advanced technology which
MNCs already obtained in Thailand to the entire textile industry.
In the 1980s, the government did not implement policies to address
these problems. To improve industrial competitiveness, what kind
of policy should the government have implemented?
First, the government should have upgraded product quality.
Based on the fact that the international market requires higher
quality than the Thai market, the government should have
established an inspection system. Particularly, increases in wages
will require higher quality, such as no defect in weaving and
color fastness. As for small- and medium-sized firms, direct
assistance was necessary. Based on the analyses in previous
chapters, small- and medium-sized firms lacked all aspects of
technology, such as production technology and sales technology.
These firms also lacked financial resources to purchase new,
efficient machines (Chapter 3).
As for diversification, the government should have recognized
the differences between the international market and the domestic
market not only in terms of quality but also in terms of
diversification: In Thailand, polyester filament yarn has not
developed markedly from the 1960s to the 1980s, because there were
little demand for it in the domestic market (chapter 4), while
99
filament materials are very popular in the international market.
On the other hand, t-he government has promoted export clothing
firms regardless of what kind of weaving materials these clothing
firms use. As a result, filament fabrics has held a large share of
total import of fabrics. If the government had also promoted
technological development of filament firms when it promoted
clothing of high value-added goods, the import of filament would
have been lower. Moreover, the government should also rethink its
policy simply limiting working visas for foreigners. Difficulty to
master advanced technology differs depending on type of products.
Compared to grey fabrics, production skill of filament is more
difficult and takes more time to localize (chapter 4). Thus, the
government needs to reconsider how to localize more advanced
production technology.
To grapple with these differences n quality and variety
between the domestic and the international markets, two
perspectives for industrial structure are important. First, the
government should have considered creation of industrial linkages
between the weaving and clothing industries. Industrial linkage
may also assist a firm's decision-making concerning production
expansion and diversification. For example, even when textile and
clothing exports expanded in the middle of 1980s, Thai textile
firms hesitated to expand production because of uncertainty about
demand75. If textile manufacturers could exchange information with
75 Yoshioka, 1987, and Mitsubishi Trading Companies, 1988.
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clothing manufacturers regarding industrial linkage, their
uncertainty would be reduced. Since only industrial linkages which
FDI created is not sufficient to compete in the international
market, government support is necessary.
Second, the government should also have considered whether to
create technological diffusion routes. Since small and medium-
sized firms do not have production and sales technologies, capital
accumulation and business abilities, it is difficult to support
all of these factors only by government organization, such as TID.
"Small and medium scale companies, which cannot engage
in research and development and build up technical
knowhow by themselves, ask the TID for guidance and
resolution of their problems. However, it may be
difficult for TID to establish some technical knowhow
which requires experiments and equipment on the same
scale as actual production." (JICA, 1989: I-99)
If firms that have achieved advanced technologies would
support some of these factors by creating technological diffusion
routes, less developed firms would be able to master the technical
knowhow more efficiently. In textile competitive countries,
several industrial structures which promote industrial linkage or
technological diffusion have been successful. For instance, the
Japanese textile industry achieved a comparative advantage in
manufacturing high quality goods through certain technological
diffusion routes. Large-sized textile fiber firms subcontract with
small weaving firms to provide them with designs to produce high
quality stylized goods. Large-sized firms also invest in and
provide their weavers with advanced textile machines. As a result,
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the Japanese textile industry has the advantage of having achieved
a flexible production system through its linked subcontracting
system, even though small-sized Japanese firms have little
business ability, design ability, or capital accumulation7 6. Rather
their production and sales technologies are supported by large-
sized firms. Even if small weaving firms have not been able to
acquire these factors necessary for long-term competitiveness,
they have been able to survive over the long run. These small-
sized firms, using their weaving skills, have been able to create
high value-added, quality fabrics. In a recessionary period,
production is adjusted through trading companies and sanmoto.
Similarly but differently, Italian weavers are famous for
their high design ability. In the Italian textile industry, small
weavers have both weaving skill and design ability, and are used
to flexible production schedules. The Italians design fabrics to
produce high quality goods, and sell them to clothing firms. If
one firm succeeds in selling its goods because of the quality of
its design, other firms can receive, through a process of
subcontracting, a part of the successful firm's order 77.
Consequently, small firms share the benefits of belonging to such
groups. Although these small Italian firms do not have large
amounts of capital, their cooperation reduces production risks; if
one weaver's designs do not sell well, the other weavers will
76 Kokumin Kinyukoko, 1990.
7 7 Fujii, 1994.
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provide work for the ailing firm. Therefore, in both Japanese and
Italian cases, small-sized firms received support of capital
investment and business abilities by being a part of industrial
oriented linkages. Japanese small-sized firms receive support of
capital and business ability from their large-sized textile firms
or Japanese trading companies. Italian firms tend to survive,
based on their own business abilities, and shared financial risks.
This system also promotes industrial sector linkages. In the
Japanese textile industry, trading companies, acting as middlemen
for clothing and textile firms, have information about what kind
of fabrics are in demanded by the clothing market. Information
concerning clothing demand is relayed to large-sized textile fiber
firms, which then place their orders with the small-sized weaving
firms. Therefore, small-sized weaving and clothing firms work in
tandem to create an efficient production system that meets market
demands.
In Thailand there is no industrial structure exists to
diffuse market information and advanced technology. Large-sized
firms do not spread their technology because they and small-sized
firms belong to totally different industrial structures (Figure 3-
5), in which there is no subcontracting system linking them.
As discussed in chapter 4, The government policies did not
prompt industrial linkages in the 1980s. Textile industrial
policies were incoherent, and promotion of the clothing industry
was not related to technological development in the textile
industry. For example, firms which produce staple fibers often
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hold meetings and discuss how much they should produce (interview
#16). As discussed previously, these firms usually have their own
weaving factories and yarns they produce are distributed only to
large-sized firms. However, since members of TSFA do not include
statistics for imported fabrics, they have not expanded their
production to meet the demand of the clothing manufacturers. The
same problems can be seen in the dyeing and textile machinery
industries. Although the Thai government imposed high tariffs on
the import of textile machinery, competitiveness in the textile
machinery industry is not strong, and the technological gap
between Thai textile machine manufacturers and Japanese and
European producers is extremely high. Therefore, even with tariff
protection, the Thai textile machinery industry is not expected to
catch up to those at the advanced international levels7 8. On the
other hand, high tariffs on dyes and textile machines hindered
textile manufacturers from purchasing advanced technology. To
avoid these problems, the government should implement coherent
industrial policies in terms of industrial linkage and determine
which industries it will support.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the role of FDI and government in the
technological development of the Thai textile industry. Based on
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78 JICA, 1989.
Figure 5-1, I conclude that the key role of FDI is limited to the
effect of development at the level of he firm, while the role of
the government is expected to encourage development for the entire
industry as well as at the firm level.
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6. Conclusion
Based on the analyses in previous chapters, this thesis
concludes that the FDI did not replace the role of the government
in the Thai textile industry. From the 1960s to he 1970s, the
Thai textile industry developed by cooperating with MNCs and the
government. Since MNCs also promoted other large-sized firms and
created competitive industrial linkage, the FDI played key role on
industrial development. During this period, development of large-
sized firms was synonymous with the development of the Thai
textile industry. The government supported this development by
providing financial priviledges to large-sized firms. However, in
the 1980s, when production expansion and diversification were
necessary, the effect of FDI on the entire textile industry became
limited. The government should devise an institutional system so
that FDI's effect on technological development is maximized. A
simple export promotion policy is not enough. Industrial policies
which promote inter-firm and sector linkage was expected to
promote competitiveness in the long run. However, the government
did not implement any policies which would promote the industrial
linkage and technological development of all of firms.
Consequently, the Thai textile industry is prospected to lose its
international competitiveness in the future.
In the beginning of the 1990s, the Thai government started to
consider a policy for industrial linkage in the textile industry;
the BOI has promoted "supporting industries", such as the dyeing
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and printing sectors (Appendix 1). Whethe- the Thai textile
industry can further develop its technology to be competitive over
the long-run depends on both textile firms and the government.
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Appendix 1 Thai Textile Industrial Policy
1. Import Substitution Period (1960-71)
(1) BOI investment promotion policy (1960-71)
* full exemption of import duties and business taxes on imports
of new equipment and machinery
* exemption from income tax for a five-year period
* up to 33.33% exemption from import and business taxes on
necessary raw materials for a five-year period
* elimination of restriction for foreigners about aquisition of
real estate or remittance to home countries.
Conditions:
* must have not less than three thousand spindles of spinning
frame, and fifty weaving looms
* machinery and equipment approved by the BOI must be used
1962-64, 1968-71: spinning and weaving of cotton yarn and cloth
1968-71 : spinning and weaving of man-made fibre
(2) Tariff protection (1962- present)
(3) Import quota (1957-68)
1957-68 : cotton yarns and fabrics
* 1957: prohibited imports of cotton yarns of 0-26 count cotton
grey shirting, and some finished forms of cotton grey cloth
controlled imports of cotton yarn of 27-40 counts
* 1965 : controlled 40-46 counts
2. Weaving Export promotion period (1972- 1980) (See Figure 4)
1973: Oil crisis causes global economic recession
Due to the end of the Vietnam war, Thai textiles lose a
large market, including Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
The Thai textile industry has problems with oversupply
To eliminate oversupply problems in the domestic market, and
promote exports......
(1) BOI investment promotion
· condition: export not less than 65 - 100% of production
1973- :spinning, weaving, dyeing, printing and finishing
* new firm must use new machines to improve the quality of
textile goods
* minimum investment of 10 million bahts.
* even non-promoted export firms were exempted from export
duties and business taxes, and import duties, business tax
and municipal taxes on raw materials (difference from BOI
policy is only exemption of income tax)
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(2) MOI control
1971. 10-
* to deal with oversupply problems and raise the technology
level of the textile industry
* no control for garments
* factories cannot expand yarn and fabric productions for the
domestic market
* producers are free to increase production for exports
(3) Bank of Thailand rediscounted facilities
* provided rediscount facilities to commercial banks at the
rate of 5% for promissory notes for which commercial banks
charge their customers 7%
* up to 90% of the export value, not exceeding 3 months
(4) Subsidies on-Electricity costs
· reduction rate was 3.33%
* not so effective because ratio of this cost is small to total
cost
3. Clothing Export promotion period (1981- present)
Government policy basically did not change. The government
promoted exports from the textile and clothing sectors.
(1) Protection for domestic markets
Since there was still a problem of oversupply in the yarn and
fabric sectors, the government protected domestic markets by
setting high tariff rates to keep textile goods from declining
drastically in price and quality; until 1987, the government
continually restricted the number of weaving and spinning
production facilities in the domestic market.
(2) Promotion of exports
Exemption of import tariffs on input materials for all textile and
clothing manufacturers.
(3) Cancel the control of weaving and spinning machines effected
in 1987
With increase in clothing export
(4) Present condition: factories must be located in zone 3 (not
central areas)
As for, dyeing industry, there is no condition.
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BOI promotion
1984- : Garment manufacturing is eligible for promotion with
following conditions
* 100% export requirement
* Net foreign exchange must be at least 30% of total sales at
all times.
* Machinery and parts must be new.
* No corpprate income tax exemption is given
* ]Documents indicating capability and expertise in seeking
export markets must be submitted.
1986-: Yarn spinning, weaving and knitting industries are eligible
for promotion with the following conditions:
* The minimum investment is 50 million baht.
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Appendix 2 Classification
1. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
In this paper, FDI includes both multinational companies'
direct investment an.! joint ventures which local Thai firms
contract with foreign multinational companies.
2. Large-sized and Small- & Medium-sized firms
In Thailand, it is difficult to define large-, medium- and
small-sized firms based on statistical data, because of shortage
of accurate data. I classify large-sized firms as firms which are
the member of the Thai Textile Manufacturing Association (TTMA),
and small- and medium-sized firms as firms which are the member of
the Thai Weaving Manufacturing Association (TWMA). In the Thai
textile industry, most large-sized firms generally belonged to
TTMA, while many small and medium sized firms belonged to TWMA
(TWIA).
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Appendix 3 Contents of Interview Survey
Board of Investment (BOI)
#1 Deputy Secretary General
#2 in charge of textile division at present
#3 in charge of textile division from 1987 to 1992
#4 in charge of investment of Japanese multinational companies
Questions
1. Objective of BOI
2. Contents and objective of each person's work
3. Outline of the BOI textile policies from the 1960s to present
4. Objectives of BOI textile policies
5. Future prospect for the Thai textile industry
6. Relationship with Ministry of Industry
Ministry of Industry
#5 Department of Industrial Promotion, Director General,
in charge of textile policy in the 1970s
#6 Senior Scientist, Textile Industry Division
#7 Senior Industrial Technical Officer, Textile Industry Division
Questions
1. Objective of MOI
2. Contents and objective of each person's work
3. Outline of the MOI textile policies from the 1960s to present
4. Objectives of MOI textile policies
5. Future prospect for the Thai textile industry
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Textile firms
2 largest textile MNCs in Thailand: Teijin & Toray
Have all stage of production system
: fiber, spinning, weaving, and dyeing
FDI started in the 1960s (st and 2nd FDI in Thailand)
A. Teijin
1967 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) started (27.8 million baht capital)
P/R spinning, weaving and dyeing
1970 Production of staple fiber started
1971 Production of filament yarn started
early the 1980s withdrew from weaving and dyeing sectors
1990 Thai Namsiri (filament weaving and dyeing) started
1994 Production of spun bond fabric started
Products: 200 tons of spun bond fabrics, 6,500 tons of staple fiber,
2040 tons of filament yarn in 1994.
Divirsified, high value-added filament yarn
Capital: 319 million baht
Weaving and dyeing firm: Thai Namusiri (Polyester filament)
Majority of products heads for local textile mills.
#8 President (from 1995)
#9 Executive director, General manager for sales
#10 Manager, Textile Trade Department
#11 Senior associate, Fibers Strategy Department
#12 President (1991-93)
#13 ex-executive director
B. Luckytex
1960 Established (5 million Baht capital)
1961 Started production of spun woven fabrics, and dyeing.
1975 Toray Industries Inc. participated in the management.
1976 Started production of spun woven fabrics (heavy weight).
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1983 Toray Industries Inc. gained majority of shares of the company.
1989 Stocks listed on Stock exchange of Thailand.
Started production of polyester filament woven fabrics (Taffeta for
lining)
Modernization by introducing up-to-date looms, such as air jet and water
jet looms.
1992 Established new dyeing factory for polyester filament woven fabrics.
Capital: 518.4 million baht in March, 1994.
Total assets: 4,183.8 million baht in March 1994.
Products: Spun Polyester, P/C, Cotton fabrics, Denim, and Polyester
filament fabrics
Sales amount: 3,107 million baht (April,1993-March,1994)
Spinning, weaving and dyeing
Weaving export: 70% of production
Spun weaving:occupies 80% of EC quota, and 15-20% of US quota
Filament: 92% of US quota (EC has no quota)
#14 Director, Sales division
#15 Director, Mill manager
C. Toray Nylon Thai Co., Ltd.
1963 FDI started (30 million baht:Toray group total, Japan 100%)
spinning, weaving, and dyeing of P/R
1992 started polyester filament yarn
Capital: 12 million baht
Products: Polyester filament, Nylon filament, polyester POY (800ton)
Spinning, weaving, and dyeing firms
: Siam Synthetic (Nylon filament 1.2million yard/month,
5 mil.B capital)
Toray Textile (P/R fabrics, 40% export)
Thai Kurabo (P/C 2.5 million yard/month, 75 mil.B capital)
Luckytex
#16 President of Toray Nylon Thai (President of Thai
Synthetic Fiber Association)
#17 ex-President in spinning, weaving, dyeing division (1977-
79)
D. Thai textile large-sized firm
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Established in 1975, have fiber, spinning, weaving and dyeing
division
#18 President
E. Thai Namsiri Intex Co.,Ltd.
Established in 1990, have spinning and weaving divisions closely
related to Teijin, most advanced machinery, such as rapier, and water jet
looms
Products: 16 million yards of polyester filament fabrics
Shin-gosen fabrics (most high value-added material)
Capital : 200 million baht in 1994
#19 Executive ice President
F. Thai textile medium-sized firm
Established in 1969, have spinning, weaving and dyeing divisions
#20 President
G. Thai textile medium-sized firm
Have spinning, weaving and dyeing divisions
Products: Yarn-dyed fabrics, Home textiles, Shirting and
suiting fabrics
Rapier was introduced in 1990
#21 President, and head of The Thai Weaving Industry
Association (TWIA)
Questions
1. History of company and the Thai textile industry
2. Kind of production falicities
3. Contents of production skills
4. Contents of production strategies
Type of products
Production process
Human resource management
Global strategies or not?
5. Sales strategies
domestic or export sales?
-US, EC, Japan, Asian countries, or Middle East
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marketing channel: use trading companies or not?
future strategy: how to compete with China and Indonesia?
6. Future perspectives for your company
7. Future perspectives for the Thai textile industry
8. Suggestions or request to the government policy
Japanese Trading Company
#22 Mitsui &Co. (Thailand) Ltd, in charge of textile industry
#23 Mitsubishi Trading Company, in charge of textile industry
Questions
1. Difference between production technology among Japanese MNCs,
local large-sized firms, and local small- and medium-sized firms
2. Quality of Thai textile products
3. Sales strategy: how to compete with China and Indonesia
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Appendix 4 Thai Multinational Textile Firms
Founded Name Products
1961 Luckytex Co.Ltd. J P/C & C spinning, weaving & dyeing
1963 Thai Yazaki-Mahaguna J P/C & C weaving
Textile Co.Ltd. Withdraw in 1978
1963 Thai Toray Textile J P/R
Mills Co.Ltd.
1963 Tokai Dyeing J Dyeing
1964 Thai Blancket Industry J C spinning & weaving
1965 Thai Teijin Textile J P/R
Ltd.
1966 Thai ricott Co.Ltd. J Dyeing
1968 Teijin Polyester J Polyester
1968 Thai Kurabo Co.Ltd. J P/C weaving
1969 Thai American Textile J P/C, P/R spinning & weaving
Co.Ltd.
1969 Siam Synthetic Textile J Filament
Industry Ltd.
1970 Asia Fiber T Polyester
1970 Siam Dyeing & Printing J Dyeing & Printing
Co.Ltd.
1971 Erawan Textile Co.Ltd. J P/C, C weaving
1971 Union Kanebo Spinning J P/C, C spinning & weaving
Mills Co.Ltd. (Union (Withdraw)
Spinning Mills)
1972 Thai Iryo Co.Ltd. J Garments
1972 Thai Melon Polyester F Polyester
1973 Union Olympus Co.Ltd. J Embroidery & crochet thread
(Union Novelty Yarn) (Withdraw)
1974 Dusit Textile Co.Ltd. J P/C, C weaving
* C: Cotton, P/C: Polyester cotton, P/R: Polyester rayon
** J: Japanese, T: Taiwanese, F: French
Source: Yoshiok, M., "The Thai Textile Industry," (Tai no Senni Sangyo Zizyo) in Kasen GeDDo, June,
1988.
Suehiro, A., "The Thai Textile Industry and Japaneses Multinational companies," (Tai Senni
Sangyo to Nikkei Takkokuseki Kigyo), Asian Economy, January, 1979.
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